Mind 125 (500):1161-1198 (2016)
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This paper defends a novel view of ‘what it is like’-sentences, according to which they attribute certain sorts of relations—I call them ‘affective relations’—that hold between events and individuals. The paper argues in detail for the superiority of this proposal over other views that are prevalent in the literature. The paper further argues that the proposal makes better sense than the alternatives of the widespread use of Nagel’s definition of conscious states and that it also shows the mistakes in two prominent suggestions about the definition when properly understood: first, that it is empty and uninformative, and second, that it leads directly to a substantial claim in the theory of consciousness, namely that an individual is in a conscious state only if the individual is aware of their being in that state.
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DOI | 10.1093/mind/fzv179 |
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References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
View all 47 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Knowing What It is Like and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):105-120.
‘What It is Like’ Talk is Not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.
De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves1.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and What-It-is-Like-Ness.Jonathan Farrell - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2743-2761.
View all 15 citations / Add more citations
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2016-09-08
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138 ( #69,174 of 2,403,176 )
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21 ( #36,979 of 2,403,176 )
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