Analytical dispositionalism and practical reason

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):117-133 (1999)
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Abstract

The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed to the denial of metaphysical modesty, and thereby as committed to the existence of a response independent normative reality.

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Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London

Citations of this work

Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
Moral Cognitivism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.
Integrity and moral danger.Greg Scherkoske - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):335-358.
Integrity and Moral Danger.Greg Scherkoske - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):335-358.

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References found in this work

Moral values, projection, and secondary qualities.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62 (1):1-26.

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