Argumentation 28 (1):67-84 (2014)
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Abstract |
I argue that Kotzee’s model of meta- debate succeeds in identifying illegitimate or fallacious charges of bias but has the unintended consequence of classifying some legitimate and non-fallacious charges as fallacious. This makes the model, in some important cases, counter-productive. In particular, cases where the call for a meta- debate is prompted by the participant with epistemic privilege and a charge of bias is denied by the participant with social advantage, the impasse will put the epistemically advantaged at far greater risk. Therefore, I propose treating epistemic privilege as a variety of expert opinion specifically in cases where meta- debate participants come to an impasse in deliberation. My proposal exposes the problem of interpreting debate contexts as both adversarial and free from social power differentials.
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Keywords | Epistemic privilege Meta-debate Social context Social identity Bias |
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DOI | 10.1007/s10503-013-9299-6 |
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning.Douglas Walton & Erik C. W. Krabbe - 1995 - State University of New York Press.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
View all 12 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Arguments From Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):175-195.
Introduction: Virtues and Arguments.Andrew Aberdein & Daniel H. Cohen - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):339-343.
Bringing Wreck.Tempest Henning - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
Feminist Perspectives on Argumentation.Catherine E. Hundleby - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Argument and Social Justice" and "Reasoning for Change.Catherine Hundleby - 2021 - Informal Logic 41 (1):1-16.
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