Argumentation 28 (1):67-84 (2014)

Authors
Maureen Linker
University of Michigan, Dearborn
Abstract
I argue that Kotzee’s model of meta- debate succeeds in identifying illegitimate or fallacious charges of bias but has the unintended consequence of classifying some legitimate and non-fallacious charges as fallacious. This makes the model, in some important cases, counter-productive. In particular, cases where the call for a meta- debate is prompted by the participant with epistemic privilege and a charge of bias is denied by the participant with social advantage, the impasse will put the epistemically advantaged at far greater risk. Therefore, I propose treating epistemic privilege as a variety of expert opinion specifically in cases where meta- debate participants come to an impasse in deliberation. My proposal exposes the problem of interpreting debate contexts as both adversarial and free from social power differentials.
Keywords Epistemic privilege  Meta-debate  Social context  Social identity  Bias
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10503-013-9299-6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,518
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?Sandra Harding - 1991 - Cornell University Press.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Bringing Wreck.Tempest Henning - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
Feminist Perspectives on Argumentation.Catherine E. Hundleby - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Poisoning the Well and Epistemic Privilege.Ben Kotzee - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (3):265-281.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.
Epistemic Expressivism.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
Is Meta-Analysis the Platinum Standard of Evidence?Jacob Stegenga - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (4):497-507.
Epistemic Comparative Conditionals.Linton Wang - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):133 - 156.
Structuralism and Meta-Mathematics.Simon Friederich - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):67 - 81.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-08-05

Total views
29 ( #362,553 of 2,421,640 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #352,281 of 2,421,640 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes