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Eric Wiland [35]Eric G. Wiland [1]Eric Gartner Wiland [1]
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Eric Wiland
University of Missouri, St. Louis
  1.  5
    Reasons.Eric Wiland - 2012 - Continuum.
    When we say we 'act for a reason', what do we mean? And what do reasons have to do with being good or bad? Introducing readers to a foundational topic in ethics, Eric Wiland considers the reasons for which we act. You do things for reasons, and reasons in some sense justify what you do. Further, your reasons belong to you, and you know the reasons for which you act in a distinctively first-personal way. Wiland lays out and critically reviews (...)
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  2.  26
    Moral Advice and Joint Agency.Eric Wiland - 2018 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 102-123.
    There are many alleged problems with trusting another person’s moral testimony, perhaps the most prominent of which is that it fails to deliver moral understanding. Without moral understanding, one cannot do the right thing for the right reason, and so acting on trusted moral testimony lacks moral worth. This chapter, however, argues that moral advice differs from moral testimony, differs from it in a way that enables a defender of moral advice to parry this worry about moral worth. The basic (...)
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  3.  5
    (En)Joining Others.Eric Wiland - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-84.
    This paper argues that under some conditions, when one person acts on the direction of another person, the two of them thereby act together, and that this explains why both the director and the directee can be responsible for what is done. In other words, a director and a directee can be a joint agent, one whose members are responsible for what they together do. This is most clearly so when the directive is a command. But it is also sometimes (...)
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  4.  7
    Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive.Eric Wiland - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    Is there anything peculiarly bad about accepting moral testimony? According to pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an inadequate substitute for working out your moral views on your own. Enlightenment requires thinking for oneself, at least where morality is concerned. Optimists, by contrast, aim to show that trusting moral testimony isn’t bad largely by arguing that it’s no worse than trusting testimony generally. Essentially, they play defense. However, this chapter goes on the offensive. It explores two reasons for thinking that trusting (...)
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  5.  3
    Should Children Have the Right to Vote?Eric Wiland - 2018 - In David Boonin, Katrina L. Sifferd, Tyler K. Fagan, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Michael Huemer, Daniel Wodak, Derk Pereboom, Stephen J. Morse, Sarah Tyson, Mark Zelcer, Garrett VanPelt, Devin Casey, Philip E. Devine, David K. Chan, Maarten Boudry, Christopher Freiman, Hrishikesh Joshi, Shelley Wilcox, Jason Brennan, Eric Wiland, Ryan Muldoon, Mark Alfano, Philip Robichaud, Kevin Timpe, David Livingstone Smith, Francis J. Beckwith, Dan Hooley, Russell Blackford, John Corvino, Corey McCall, Dan Demetriou, Ajume Wingo, Michael Shermer, Ole Martin Moen, Aksel Braanen Sterri, Teresa Blankmeyer Burke, Jeppe von Platz, John Thrasher, Mary Hawkesworth, William MacAskill, Daniel Halliday, Janine O’Flynn, Yoaav Isaacs, Jason Iuliano, Claire Pickard, Arvin M. Gouw, Tina Rulli, Justin Caouette, Allen Habib, Brian D. Earp & Andrew Vierra (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy. Springer Verlag. pp. 215-224.
    No citizen should be denied the right to vote due solely to her age. We can see this by showing that all objections to it fail. It might be objected that it is not unjust to so deprive children because children as a group are unintelligent or irrational, have their interests already represented by the parents, or are justly deprived of many other rights, among other reasons. But all these objections fail because there is no evidence to support it, even (...)
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  6. Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism.Eric Wiland - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):352–360.
  7.  61
    In the Beginning Was the Doing: The Premises of the Practical Syllogism.Eric Wiland - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):303-321.
    (2013). In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 303-321.
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  8.  69
    Peer Disagreement and the Dunning-Kruger Effect.Eric Wiland - 2016 - Episteme 14 (4):481-498.
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  9.  17
    Peer Disagreement: Special Cases.Eric Wiland - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):221-226.
    When you discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some matter, does rationality require you to alter your views? Concessivists answer in the affirmative, but their view faces a problem in special cases. As others have noted, if concessivism itself is what’s under dispute, then concessivism seems to undermine itself. But there are other unexplored special cases too. This article identifies three such special cases, and argues that concessivists in fact face no special problem.
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  10.  90
    How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?Eric Wiland - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):275-301.
    Most act-utilitarians now reject the direct utilitarianism of Bentham. They do so because they are convinced of what I call the paradox of utilitarianism -- the thought that one cannot maximize happiness if one is trying to maximize happiness. Instead, they adopt some form of indirect utilitarianism (IU), arguing that the optimal decision procedure may differ markedly from the criterion of rightness for actions. Here I distinguish between six different versions of indirect utilitarianism, arguing that the weaker versions of IU (...)
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  11.  62
    The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory.Eric Wiland - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):279-284.
    J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of rule worship . Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to (...)
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  12.  45
    Psychologism, Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error.Eric Wiland - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):68–78.
    Psychologism is the view that practical reasons are psychological states. It is widely thought that psychologism is supported by the following principle governing explanation: TF. The difference between false and true beliefs on A's part cannot alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to A's actions. (TF) seems to imply that we always need to cite agents' beliefs when explaining their actions, no matter whether those beliefs are true or false. And this seems to vindicate psychologism. I (...)
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  13.  3
    Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action.Eric Wiland - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-216.
    Bernard Williams argued that philosophers should pay more attention to the role thick ethical concepts play in our moral thinking, and, separately, that all reasons for action depend in the first place upon the agent's pre-exisitng motives. Here I argue that these two views are in tension. Much like the standard examples of thick ethical concepts, the concept REASONABLE is likewise thick, and the features of the world that guide its correct use have much less to do with the agent's (...)
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  14.  70
    Advice and Moral Objectivity.Eric Wiland - 2000 - Philosophical Papers 29 (1):1-19.
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  15.  98
    Intentional Action and "in Order To".Eric Wiland - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation of the experiments Knobe (...)
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  16.  38
    Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will.Eric Wiland - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):371-389.
  17. On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden.Eric Wiland - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):296–299.
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  18.  60
    Good Advice and Rational Action.Eric Wiland - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.
    This paper launches a new criticism of Michael Smith’s advice model of internalism. Whereas Robert Neal Johnson argues that Smith’s advice model collapses into the example model of internalism, the author contends that taking advice seriously pushes us instead toward some version of externalism. The advice model of internalism misportrays the logic of accepting advice. Agents do not have epistemic access to what their fully rational selves would advise them to do, and so it is necessary for a model of (...)
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  19.  40
    Book ReviewJoseph Hamburger,. John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. 239. $35.00. [REVIEW]Eric Wiland - 2001 - Ethics 111 (3):637-638.
  20.  52
    Some Advice for Moral Psychologists.Eric Wiland - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):299–310.
    Recently, philosophers have employed the notion of advice to tackle a variety of philosophical problems. In particular, Michael Smith and Nomy Arpaly have in different ways related the notion of advice to the notion of a reason for action. Here I argue that both accounts are flawed, because each operates with a simplistic picture of the way advice works. I conclude that it would be wise to take more time to analyze what advice is and how it in fact works, (...)
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  21.  35
    Book Reviews Shafer‐Landau, Russ , Ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics . Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 327. $39.95 (Paper). [REVIEW]Eric Wiland - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):202-205.
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  22.  10
    Good Advice and Rational Action.Eric Wiland - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.
    This paper launches a new criticism of Michael Smith's advice model of internalism. Whereas Robert Neal Johnson argues that Smith's advice model collapses into the example model of internalism, the author contends that taking advice seriously pushes us instead toward some version of externalism. The advice model of internalism misportrays the logic of accepting advice. Agents do not have epistemic access to what their fully rational selves would advise them to do, and so it is necessary for a model of (...)
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  23.  37
    The Limits of Maximization: Actions, Decision Procedures, and Meta-Decision Procedures.Eric Wiland - 2010 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):99-116.
    A nagging problem for the consequentialist is the fact that a person who chooses the action-option that seems to her to maximize good consequences all toooften does not produce consequences as good as she would have produced had she thought about her decision in some other fashion. In response, indirect consequentialists typically recommend that one take advantage of whatever benefits the employment of a nonconsequentialist decision procedure may provide. But I argue here that the consequentialist cannot straightforwardly appropriate the decision (...)
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  24.  6
    Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility.Eric Wiland - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 77--87.
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  25.  39
    On Indirectly Self-Defeating Moral Theories.Eric Wiland - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):384-393.
    Derek Parfit has notably argued that while a moral theory should not be directly self-defeating, there is nothing necessarily wrong with a moral theory that is only indirectly self-defeating. Here I resist this line of argument. I argue instead that indirectly self-defeating moral theories are indeed problematic. Parfit tries to sidestep the oddities of indirectly self-defeating theories by focusing on the choice of dispositions rather than actions. But the very considerations that can make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims (...)
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  26. 598 AUTHOR Jack Weir Patricia H. Werhane.Eric Wiland - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36:597-598.
     
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  27.  22
    Theories of Practical Reason.Eric Wiland - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (4):450-467.
    Leading theories of practical reason can be grouped into one of four families: psychologism, realism, compatibilism, and Aristotelianism. Although there are many differences among the theories within each family, I ignore these in order to ask which family is most likely to deliver a satisfactory philosophical account of reasons for action. I articulate three requirements we should expect any adequate theory of practical reason to meet: it should account for how reasons explain action, how reasons justify action, and how an (...)
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  28.  19
    Is There Ethical Knowledge?Eric Wiland - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):63-68.
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  29.  13
    Metaethics and Ethics.John Brunero & Eric Wiland - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  30.  24
    Stories, Autobiographies, and Moral Inquiry.Eric G. Wiland - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (2):188–198.
  31. Nicholas Smith, Strong Hermeneutics Reviewed By.Eric Wiland - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19 (1):66-68.
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  32. Nicholas Smith, Strong Hermeneutics. [REVIEW]Eric Wiland - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19:66-68.
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  33. Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism About Motivating Reasons.Eric Wiland - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197-213.
    People do things for various reasons. Are these motivating reasons psychological? I argue here that such reasons are typically not purely psychological. Yet there is an important psychological element or aspect of these reasons. I proceed by first reviewing some arguments for and against psychologism about (motivating) reasons. Next, I do the same for the view that reasons are typically non-psychological facts. I then explore some additional alternatives: a) disjunctivist views, b) the appositional account, and finally c) naïve action theory, (...)
     
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  34. Rossian Deontology and the Possibility of Moral Expertise.Eric Wiland - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 159-178.
    It seems that we can know moral truths. We are also rather reluctant to defer to moral testimony. But it’s not obvious how moral cognitivism is compatible with pessimism about moral testimony. If moral truths are knowable, shouldn’t it be possible for others to know moral truths you don’t know, so that it is wise for you to defer to what they say? Or, alternatively, if it’s always reasonable to refuse to defer to the wisest among us, doesn’t this show (...)
     
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  35. The Ethics of Terror and Torture.Eric Wiland - 2008 - Review Journal of Political Philosophy 6:139-152.
  36. The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness.Eric Wiland - 2018 - Religions 9.
    Here I consider the two most venerated arguments about the existence of God: the Ontological Argument and the Argument from Evil. The Ontological Argument purports to show that God’s nature guarantees that God exists. The Argument from Evil purports to show that God’s nature, combined with some plausible facts about the way the world is, guarantees (or is very compelling grounds for thinking) that God does not exist. Obviously, both arguments cannot be sound. But I argue here that they are (...)
     
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