Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):243-268 (2005)

Authors
Martin Lin
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of the Essay, he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or a soul can.
Keywords Spinoza  Personal Identity  Memory
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References found in this work BETA

Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
The Trouble with Possible Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1979 - In Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual. Cornell University Press.
Spinoza.Alan Donagan - 1988 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (2):119-121.
Descartes and Spinoza on Persistance and Conatus.Daniel Garber - 1994 - Studia Spinozana: An International and Interdisciplinary Series 10:43-68.

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Citations of this work BETA

Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason.Róbert Mátyási - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):1-16.
Spinoza on Composition, Causation, and the Mind's Eternity.John Grey - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):446-467.
Individuation and Death in Spinoza’s Ethics: The Spanish Poet Case Reconsidered.Davide Monaco - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):941-958.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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