Authors
Barry Maguire
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. It is argued that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. Its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of Reasons on the table in discussions of normative reasons, and to draw attention to a number of areas for fruitful further research.
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.009
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-36.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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