Disagreeing about how to disagree

Philosophical Studies 168 (3):823-34 (2014)


David Enoch, in Taking Morality Seriously, argues for a broad normative asymmetry between how we should behave when disagreeing about facts and how we should behave when disagreeing due to differing preferences. Enoch claims that moral disputes have the earmarks of a factual dispute rather than a preference dispute and that this makes more plausible a realist understanding of morality. We try to clarify what such claims would have to look like to be compelling and we resist his main conclusions.


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David Sobel
Syracuse University

References found in this work

Subjectivism and Idealization.David Sobel - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):336-352.
Why Idealize?David Enoch - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):759-787.

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