Philosophical Studies 168 (3):823-34 (2014)

David Sobel
Syracuse University
David Enoch, in Taking Morality Seriously, argues for a broad normative asymmetry between how we should behave when disagreeing about facts and how we should behave when disagreeing due to differing preferences. Enoch claims that moral disputes have the earmarks of a factual dispute rather than a preference dispute and that this makes more plausible a realist understanding of morality. We try to clarify what such claims would have to look like to be compelling and we resist his main conclusions.
Keywords Enoch  Taking Morality Seriously  Meta-ethics  Disagreement  Normative Realism
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0217-4
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References found in this work BETA

Why Idealize?David Enoch - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):759-787.
Subjectivism and Idealization.David Sobel - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):336-352.

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How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist.Emad Atiq - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.

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