Just plain "ought''

The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):269-291 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'''' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'''' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'''' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'''' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp''s recent attempt toshow that in fact there is no such thing asjust plain ``ought.'''' A theory of just plain``ought'''' emerges along the way.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,420

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Supererogation and the Case Against an 'Overall Ought'.Elizabeth Ventham - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):181-192.
The Epistemic vs. the Practical.Antti Kauppinen - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 18:137-162.
Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
On Morality's Having a Point.D. Z. Phillips & H. O. Mounce - 1965 - Philosophy 40 (154):308 - 319.
Moral Dilemmas and ‘Ought and Ought Not’.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):127-139.
Normative and Recognitional Concepts.Allan Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167.
Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False.Spencer Case - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1):1-20.
Normative and recognitional concepts.Allan Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
173 (#115,006)

6 months
29 (#130,245)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Owen McLeod
Lafayette College

Citations of this work

The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.
On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter.James L. D. Brown - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral overridingness and moral theory.Sarah Stroud - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):170–189.
The Reconciliation Project.Gregory Kavka - 1984 - In David Copp & David Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 297-319.
Morality and self-interest.James P. Sterba - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):525-531.

Add more references