Epistemic Contextualism, Unarticulated Constituents and Hidden Variables

Dialogue 54 (2):225-246 (2015)
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Abstract

Epistemic contextualism was devised mainly to provide a solution to the problem of skepticism based on a thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attributing sentences. In this paper, I’ll examine two possible semantic bases of epistemic contextualism i.e., the epistemic standard is an unarticulated constituent, the epistemic standard is a hidden variable. After showing that the unarticulated constituent thesis is incompatible with epistemic contextualism, I’ll argue that the hidden variable account remains unconvincing. My aim in this paper is to show that questions remain that must be answered before epistemic contextualism can claim success in the project of resolving skepticism.

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References found in this work

Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith Derose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.
How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Literal Meaning.Kent Bach - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):487-492.

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