Abstract
Modal Arguments in the philosophy of mind purport to show that the body is not necessary for a human person’s existence. The key premise in these arguments are generally supported with thought experiments. I argue that Christians endorsing the Doctrine of the Resurrection have good reason to deny this key premise. Traditional Christianity affirms that eschatological human existence is an embodied existence in the very bodies we inhabited while alive. The raises the Resurrection Question: why would God go through the trouble of resurrecting those bodies? I argue that adequately answering this question requires give up on Modal Arguments within the philosophy of mind.
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-017-9639-9
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The Possibility of Resurrection.Peter Van Inwagen - 1978 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):114-121.
Against Materialism.Alvin Plantinga - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):3-32.
Materialism and Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press. pp. 99--141.
Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.

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