Can I survive without my body? Undercutting the Modal Argument

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):71-92 (2018)
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Abstract

Modal Arguments in the philosophy of mind purport to show that the body is not necessary for a human person’s existence. The key premise in these arguments are generally supported with thought experiments. I argue that Christians endorsing the Doctrine of the Resurrection have good reason to deny this key premise. Traditional Christianity affirms that eschatological human existence is an embodied existence in the very bodies we inhabited while alive. The raises the Resurrection Question: why would God go through the trouble of resurrecting those bodies? I argue that adequately answering this question requires give up on Modal Arguments within the philosophy of mind.

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Joshua Mugg
Park University

Citations of this work

Resurrecting van Inwagen’s simulacrum: a defense.Jordan L. Steffaniak - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 93 (3):211-225.

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References found in this work

The Emergent Self.William Hasker - 2001 - London: Cornell University Press.
Replies.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):623-635.
The Possibility of Resurrection.Peter Van Inwagen - 1978 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):114-121.

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