Desert is a dyadic relation

Analysis 82 (4):600-607 (2022)
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Abstract

The orthodox view of the metaphysics of desert is that desert is a triadic relation that obtains between a subject, an object and a desert base. Not only is this view lacking in motivation, but conceiving of the desert base as part of the desert relation renders the concept of desert incoherent. Instead, desert should be thought of as a dyadic relation between a subject and an object, where desert bases are simply the grounds for dyadic desert facts.

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Toby Napoletano
University of California, Merced

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References found in this work

Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.
Principles of Social Justice.David Miller - 2002 - Political Theory 30 (5):754-759.
Principles of Social Justice.David Miller - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):274-276.
Desert.George Sher - 1987 - Princeton University Press.

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