Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):303-334 (2009)

Al-Najjar and Weinstein argue that the extant literature on ambiguity aversion is not successful in accounting for Ellsberg choices as rational responses to ambiguity. We concur, and propose that rational choice under ambiguity aims at robustness rather than avoidance of ambiguity. A central argument explains why robust choice is intrinsically context-dependent and legitimately violates standard choice consistency conditions. If choice consistency is forced, however, ambiguity-aversion emerges as a semi-rational response to ambiguity.
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267109990265
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Emergence of Probability.Ian Hacking - 1995 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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