Deflationism and the success argument

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67 (2005)
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Abstract

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal-explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one

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References found in this work

Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):257-70.
Theories of references and truth.Stephen Leeds - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (1):111 - 129.
Causation and the philosophy of mind.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:195-214.
Minimalism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:359-369.

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