Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67 (2005)

Abstract
Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal-explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00384.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):257-70.
Theories of References and Truth.Stephen Leeds - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (1):111 - 129.
Causation and the Philosophy of Mind.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:195-214.
Minimalism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:359-369.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.
Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition.Nicholas Shea - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):404-435.
The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.
Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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True Belief is Not Instrumentally Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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Truth, Deflationism, and Success.Jerry Kapus - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:85-91.

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