Reality and Probability: Contra Williams

Social Epistemology 25 (1):57-66 (2011)
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Abstract

An account is given of Roy Bhaskar's conception of causal necessity in order to provide an objective measure for Williams' criticisms of critical realism. In light of this account, Williams' criticisms are found to fail. The reply finishes with an alternative, critical realist account of the ontological basis of probability

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Contingent or Necessary? A Response to Stephen Norrie.Malcolm Williams - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (2):167 - 172.

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