Novel facts, Bayesian rationality, and the history of continental drift

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 15 (4):267-307 (1984)
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Richard Nunan
College of Charleston

Citations of this work

How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence without Proximity.David Harker - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):79-106.
On the predilections for predictions.David Harker - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.
Predictivism for pluralists.Eric Christian Barnes - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.

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References found in this work

Why did Einstein's programme supersede lorentz's? (I).Elie Zahar - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):95-123.

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