The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54:203-227 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There are a number of ways in which a person can share the guilt of another's wrongdoing. He might advise it, command it or consent to it. He might provoke it, praise it, flatter the wrongdoer, or conceal the wrong. He might stay silent when there is a clear duty to denounce the wrong or its perpetrator; or he might positively defend the wrong done. Finally, he might actively participate or cooperate in the wrongdoing. These various activities, apart from cooperation, typically occur before or after the commission of the wrong itself, only provocation being essentially before the fact. As such they fall into the categories of seduction or comfort, seduction being essentially pre-commission and comfort post-commission. In seduction, the seducer typically leads another into doing wrong who has not definitely made up his mind. He does not assist in the commission, but he leads to its occurring. If the principal has made up his mind, actions which might otherwise amount to seduction are best characterized as amounting to scandal, since they do not lead to wrong but reinforce the principal in his wrongful intent or provide to third parties a bad example since they connote approval of the principal's action. Closely related to the concept of seduction is that of solicitation, though perhaps these are best thought of as two aspects of the same kind of activity. Seduction can be thought of as a strong form of inducement to wrong, typified by command, counsel and enticement through praise or provocation. Solicitation is a softer form of inducement typically involving requests, appeals, and invitations. Whereas the seducer or solicitor leads another into wrong but does not assist in its commission, the co-operator does not lead the principal into wrong but assists in its commission.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Who Does Wrong When an Organisation Does Wrong?Stephanie Collins - 2018 - In Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski & Tracy Lynn Isaacs (eds.), Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice. Rowman & Littlefield International.
Is it distinctively wrong to simulate doing wrong?John Tillson - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (3):205-217.
Responsibility Between Persons.Gita Cale - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
Should we prevent deontological wrongdoing?Re’em Segev - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2049-2068.
Divine Commands and Arbitrariness.Paul Rooney - 1995 - Religious Studies 31 (2):149 - 165.
On Making Actions Morally Wrong.Gerald Wallace - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):543 - 549.
Reply to Wallace's 'on making actions morally wrong'.Richard Swinburne - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):551 - 552.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-07

Downloads
78 (#218,814)

6 months
4 (#862,833)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David S. Oderberg
University of Reading

Citations of this work

Further clarity on cooperation and morality.David S. Oderberg - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (4):192-200.
Religious Accommodation in Bioethics and the Practice of Medicine.William R. Smith & Robert Audi - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (2):188-218.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Moral Theory.David S. Oderberg - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):531-534.

Add more references