Meaning and circular definitions

Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169 (2000)
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Abstract

Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.

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