Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169 (2000)

Authors
Abstract
Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.
Keywords analysis  circularity  definition  meaning  truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004775802643
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,464
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Quality and Concept.George Bealer - 1982 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Truth, Meaning, and Circularity.Claire Horisk - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269-300.
Cofinally Invariant Sequences and Revision.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (3):599-622.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Circular Justifications.Harold I. Brown - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:406 - 414.
When is Circularity in Definitions Benign?J. A. Burgess - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):214–233.
What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
84 ( #140,195 of 2,520,779 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #270,509 of 2,520,779 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes