Refuting Incompleteness and Undefinability

Abstract

Within the (Haskell Curry) notion of a formal system we complete Tarski's formal correctness: ∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢ x and use this finally formalized notion of Truth to refute his own Undefinability Theorem (based on the Liar Paradox), the Liar Paradox, and the (Panu Raatikainen) essence of the conclusion of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem.

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