Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):219-222 (2004)

Abstract
The paper concentrates on issues of intentionality subdivided into four particular sub-issues. First, is there an intentional object of depression and of states like depression? Second, according to the strong intentionalist view defended by T. Crane, what it is like to be in a mental state is fixed by the mental state’s mode and its content; but mode is not sufficiently well-defined in his analysis. Third, how can the intentionalist explain phenomenological richness of conscious mental states? Crane appeals to non-conceptual content. But in order to have such and such a content, e.g. such and such a pain, one has to recognize it on some later occasion, i.e. to be able to discriminate pains. But, discrimination brings us to concepts. It turns out that non-conceptual content is in fact just a non-linguistic or not yet lexicalized concept. Namely, in order to be re-identifiable, a pain must have a determinate and recognizable sharpness, continuity, and intensity. These are traditionally properties of a pain quale. A quale is also recognizable, it explains richness of experience, and it does not require language capability. The question is what is it that quale and non-conceptual content do not share? What sets one apart from the other? Fourth, what is the relation between the intentional object and content?
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 1333-1108
DOI croatjphil20044215
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