Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23 (2010)
According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the argument, I show that it rests on a questionable assumption - namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental content upon what she should think and do, then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). I argue that considerations regarding the roles played by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons".Richard Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
Citations of this work BETA
Demonstrative Content and the Experience of Properties.Hemdat Lerman - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):489-515.
Similar books and articles
Some Arguments Against Intentionalism.John-Michael M. Kuczynski - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.
Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-Conceptual Content.Michael D. Barber - 2008 - Husserl Studies 24 (2):79-97.
Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Perception and Conceptual Content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
Added to index2009-06-26
Total downloads110 ( #44,953 of 2,168,151 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #187,094 of 2,168,151 )
How can I increase my downloads?