Non-conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-giving

Abstract

According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the argument, I show that it rests on a questionable assumption - namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental content upon what she should think and do, then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). I argue that considerations regarding the roles played by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption

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Hemdat Lerman
University of Warwick

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.

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Citations of this work

Nonconceptual Mental Content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
III—Normative Facts and Reasons.Fabienne Peter - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):53-75.
Methods, Minds, Memory, and Kinds.Alison Springle - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):635-661.

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