An aristotelian approach to cognitive enhancement

Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that cognitive enhancement cannot be epistemically beneficial since getting things right in particular and epistemic agency in general both presuppose a kind of achievement. Drawing on Aristotle’s ethics, I distinguish four categories of actions: caused, attributable, responsible, and creditable. I conclude that to the extent that cognitive enhancement is incompatible with the latter category it undermines rather than strengthens autonomous agency in the realm of cognition

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Lubomira Radoilska
University of Kent

Citations of this work

Cognitive extension, enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):33-51.
A Thomistic appraisal of human enhancement technologies.Jason T. Eberl - 2014 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (4):289-310.
Three challenges from delusion for theories of autonomy.K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-74.
Bioenhancements and the telos of medicine.Michael J. Young - 2015 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (4):515-522.

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Human genetic enhancements: A transhumanist perspective.Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (4):493-506.

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