Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375 (2010)

Authors
Lubomira Radoilska
University of Kent
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that cognitive enhancement cannot be epistemically beneficial since getting things right in particular and epistemic agency in general both presuppose a kind of achievement. Drawing on Aristotle’s ethics, I distinguish four categories of actions: caused, attributable, responsible, and creditable. I conclude that to the extent that cognitive enhancement is incompatible with the latter category it undermines rather than strengthens autonomous agency in the realm of cognition
Keywords epistemic agency  creditable vs. broadly responsible actions  cognitive enhancement  Aristotle  virtue epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-010-9233-1
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References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Freedom to Act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Cognitive Extension, Enhancement, and the Phenomenology of Thinking.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):33-51.
Three Challenges From Delusion for Theories of Autonomy.K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-74.
A Thomistic Appraisal of Human Enhancement Technologies.Jason T. Eberl - 2014 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (4):289-310.
Some Problems with Genetic Emotional Enhancement.Felicitas Kraemer - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (4):435-447.

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