Do scientific aims justify methodological rules?

Erkenntnis 38 (2):223 - 232 (1993)
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Abstract

According to a popular view of scientific methodology, scientific methods are prescriptive rules (methodological rules) which are justified in so far as they realize or promote the aims of science. This paper considers several different interpretations of the phrase aims of science, arguing that none of these interpretations allow aims to provide a satisfactory justification of methodological rules.

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Citations of this work

Aimless science.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1211-1221.
A Pragmatic Approach To The Demarcation Problem.David B. Resnik - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):249-267.
Epistemic value: Truth or explanation?David Resnik - 1994 - Metaphilosophy 25 (4):348-361.

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