Erkenntnis 38 (2):223 - 232 (1993)

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Abstract
According to a popular view of scientific methodology, scientific methods are prescriptive rules (methodological rules) which are justified in so far as they realize or promote the aims of science. This paper considers several different interpretations of the phrase aims of science, arguing that none of these interpretations allow aims to provide a satisfactory justification of methodological rules.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128981
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Aimless Science.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1211-1221.
A Pragmatic Approach To The Demarcation Problem.David B. Resnik - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):249-267.

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