In Jens Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics (2015)

Authors
Regina Rini
York University
Abstract
This chapter discusses the philosophical relevance of empirical research on moral cognition. It distinguishes three central aims of normative ethical theory: understanding the nature of moral agency, identifying morally right actions, and determining the justification of moral beliefs. For each of these aims, the chapter considers and rejects arguments against employing cognitive scientific research in normative inquiry. It concludes by suggesting that, whichever of the central aims one begins from, normative ethics is improved by engaging with the science of moral cognition.
Keywords is/ought gap  moral agency  moral intuition  ought-implies-can  moral psychology  moral epistemology
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After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1983 - University of Notre Dame Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.

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