A New Moral Paradox?

Dialogue 51 (4):683-692 (2012)
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Abstract

In (2010), John Shand presents a challenge to the intuitive view that a wrong act performed intentionally is always morally worse, and then more culpable, than that same act performed unintentionally, so that the opposite can hold in certain circumstances. My aim here is to dissolve any appearance of paradox or counter-intuitiveness of the phenomenon in question by articulating an alternative explanation which rests upon a (plausible and helpful) distinction between two significantly different kinds of moral assessment

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Sergi Rosell
University of Valencia

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References found in this work

Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.
An Essay on Moral Responsibility.Kadri Vihvelin - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):455.
Taking offence.J. Shand - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):703-706.

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