Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (4):399-438 (1999)

This paper pursues a thorough-going instrumentalist, or means-ends, approach to the theory of inductive inference. I consider three epistemic aims: convergence to a correct theory, fast convergence to a correct theory and steady convergence to a correct theory (avoiding retractions). For each of these, two questions arise: (1) What is the structure of inductive problems in which these aims are feasible? (2) When feasible, what are the inference methods that attain them? Formal learning theory provides the tools for a complete set of answers to these questions. As an illustration of the results, I apply means-ends analysis to various versions of Goodman's Riddle of Induction
Keywords inductive inference  Goodman's Riddle of Induction  learning theory  empirical inquiry  means-ends rationality
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004443206028
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Speed-Optimal Induction and Dynamic Coherence.Michael Nielsen & Eric Wofsey - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz030.
Means-Ends Epistemology.O. Schulte - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):1-31.
The Uncertain Reasoner: Bayes, Logic, and Rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.

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