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This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Riddle of Induction illustrate the power of this approach. The paper establishes a hierarchy of means-ends notions of empirical success, and discusses a number of issues, results and applications of means-ends epistemology.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/50.1.1
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References found in this work BETA

Bayes or Bust?John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.

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Citations of this work BETA

Simplicity.Alan Baker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Belief Revision Theory.Hanti Lin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 349-396.
A New Solution to the Puzzle of Simplicity.Kevin Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):561-573.
The Problem of Induction.John Vickers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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