Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198 (2013)

Authors
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12009
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.
Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

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