The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229 (2005)
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Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F



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Michael K. Shim
California State University, Los Angeles

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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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