The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229 (2005)
Abstract
Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn FAuthor's Profile
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10.1007/s11097-005-5851-7
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Citations of this work
Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 52 (1):16-32.
Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-representational Phenomenology.Matt Bower - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
Expérience perceptuelle et contenus multiples.Arnaud Dewalque - 2011 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique.
References found in this work
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
