Holism and horizon: Husserl and McDowell on non-conceptual content

Husserl Studies 24 (2):79-97 (2008)

Abstract

John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and appreciating his insight into the experiential synthesis of intuition and conception (in particular, its role in grasping objects), I will argue that Edmund Husserl presents an even more comprehensive account of perceptual experience that explains how we experience the contribution of receptivity and sensibility and how they cooperate in perceptual discrimination. Further, it reveals “horizons”—a unique kind of contents, surplus content (rather than independent non-conceptual content)—beyond the synthesis of intuitive and conceptual contents through which objects are grasped. Such horizons play a constitutive role, making experience with its conceptual dimensions and justificatory potential possible; they in no way function like a bare given that is to fulfill some independent justificatory role. Whereas McDowell focuses on how experience does not take place in isolation from the exercise of conceptual capacities, Husserl complements his view by situating experience in a more encompassing whole and by elucidating the surplus-horizons that exceed the conceptual content of experience; play an inseparable, constitutive role within it; and indicate the limits of conceptual comprehension.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
The Tacit Dimension. --.Michael Polanyi & Amartya Sen - 1966 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.

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Citations of this work

Husserl’s Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception.Corijn van Mazijk - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):267-287.
Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention.Hanne Jacobs - 2016 - Research in Phenomenology 46 (2):257-276.
Understanding and Simple Seeing in Husserl.Timothy Mooney - 2010 - Husserl Studies 26 (1):19-48.
On Being Motivated.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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