About this topic

Husserl’s first-personal view of perceptual experience furnishes a principled alternative to current mainstream views. On the Husserlian view, perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions, rather than accuracy conditions. We perceive objects in terms of possibilities of degrees and kinds of fulfillment, i.e., better and more complete givenness, as when I examine an object from different sides, to attain a more complete overview. The idea of fulfillment also yields a non-inferential conception of how perceptual experiences justify beliefs or judgments: if I believe that there is a blackbird in the tree and then see that there is one, the two acts enter into a synthesis of fulfillment, providing justification for the belief. Lastly, the focus on fulfillments brings center-stage perceivers' embodiment, with the body’s kinaesthetic systems taking on a constitutive role in visual and other perceptual experiences.

Key works Parts of the classic Tugendhat 1967 discuss perceptual experiences in relation to the topics of fulfillment and truth. Mensch 1981, taking Husserl’s rejection of psychologism as starting point, explores the relations perceptual experiences bear to the world and to the cognitive states (or “acts”) they justify, in the Logical Investigations and Ideas I. Melle 1983 argues that Husserl, unlike Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, has a “meaning-theoretic” and “intellectualist” conception of the perceptual noema. Miller 1984 discusses Husserl's views of perceptual experiences, including the perception of time, from the point of view of the so-called West Coast interpretation, incorporating Fregean motifs. Mulligan 1995 compares Husserl’s views of perceptual experiences with those of the Gestalt psychologists, and examines Husserl's uses of the notion of “apprehension,” regarding perceptual experiences. Hopp 2011 draws upon Husserl’s views of perception and fulfillment to contribute to current debates on perceptual justification, viewing fulfillment as a kind of non-inferential perceptual justification, and taking perceptual contents as non-conceptual. Another recent contribution is Borsato 2009, considering inner and outer perception vis-à-vis imagination, and examining the relations between Brentano’s and Husserl’s views. Bernet 1978
Introductions Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 4, Woodruff Smith 2006, Ch. 6
Related categories

255 found
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  1. added 2018-12-29
    Visual Field and Empty Space.Kristjan Laasik - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In a paper titled “Seeing Empty Space,” Louise Richardson argues for the thesis that seeing empty space involves a certain “structural feature,” namely, “it [s] seeming to one as if some region of space is one in which if some visible object were there, one would see it” (SF; Richardson, 2010, p. 237). I will argue that there is a reason to question whether a structural feature such as SF is needed in order to visually experience empty space. I will (...)
  2. added 2018-12-29
    Presence by Degrees.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):125-138.
    In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Alva Noë’s discussions of perceptual presence contain an ambiguity between what I refer to as ‘presence as absence’ (PA) and ‘virtual presence’ (VP). This ambiguity emerges in Noë’s solution to ‘the problem of perceptual presence’, or the problem of how to account for our perceptual experience of that which we ‘strictly speaking’ are not seeing. Second, his account of presence by degrees, i.e. his radical claim that many distant, out-of-view objects are (...)
  3. added 2018-09-25
    Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2018 - Phenomenology and Mind 14:56-67.
    In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also (...)
  4. added 2018-09-25
    The Role of the Perceptual World in the Husserlian Theory of the Sciences.Gilbert T. Null - 1976 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 7 (1):56-59.
  5. added 2018-09-04
    Michael Madary's Visual Phenomenology.Neil Mehta - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
  6. added 2018-09-04
    Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness, by Izchak Miller. [REVIEW]Karl Ameriks - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):414.
  7. added 2018-07-08
    Ein Erkenntnisstil Neben Anderen. Zur Phänomenologie Lebensweltlicher Und Nicht Lebensweltlicher Erfahrung.Gregor Schiemann - 2007 - In D. Ginev (ed.), Aspekte der phänomenologischen Theorie der Wissenschaft. Königshausen und Neumann.
    Alfred Schütz' hat einen Kriterienkatalog zur Charakterisierung unterschiedlicher Erkenntnisstile entwickelt, in dem die Auszeichnung der Lebenswelt nur an wenigen, leicht korrigierbaren Stellen Eingang findet. (1. Abschnitt). Um ihn auf die Lebenswelt anzuwenden, rekurriere ich auf Husserls Bestimmung der Lebenswelt als Wahrnehmungswelt und auf das von Schütz und Thomas Luckmann entwickelte Schichtenmodell der Lebenswelt. Die Lebenswelt erscheint in der Konsequenz als sozial eingrenzbarer Kontext, der von anderen, geltungstheoretisch gleichrangigen Erfahrungen abgehoben ist. Sie bezeichnet keine kultur- oder naturumfassende Kategorie, sondern referiert auf (...)
  8. added 2018-06-23
    Perceptual Objectivity and the Limits of Perception.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience (...)
  9. added 2018-06-23
    Husserl's Notion of Sensation and Merleau-Ponty's Critique.Ka-Wing Leung - 2018 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 10 (1):35-49.
    ABSTRACTMerleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception begins with a critique of the philosophical notion of sensation. Even though it is often generally said to be aimed at traditional psychology or empiricism, Merleau-Ponty’s critique is without question also applicable to Husserl’s notion of sensation. The first half of this paper will offer an interpretation of Husserl’s conception of sensation as the stuff of perception and the pregivennesses for all of the Ego’s operations. And then it will attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty’s critique in (...)
  10. added 2018-06-23
    Pierre-Jean Renaudie, Husserl Et les Catégories: Langage, Pensée, Et Perception, Vrin, Bibliothèque D’Histoire de la Philosophie, 2015, 253 Pp, € 24.00, ISBN: 978-2-7116-2635-9. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (1):93-100.
  11. added 2018-06-23
    Compatibility and Tensions Between Transcendental Idealism and Common-Sense Realism — Husserl and McDowell.Wenjing Cai - 2018 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 10 (1):88-99.
    ABSTRACTThe guiding question of this comparative study is the relation between transcendental theory and common-sense realism: how to understand their compatibility, but also possible tensions between the two. This question concerns, in a broader sense, the relation between philosophy and natural life, or more precisely, what philosophy possibly can and cannot do for natural life. In the following discussion, I first introduce the idealism-realism controversy in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. I then move on to McDowell’s theory and look into a significant (...)
  12. added 2018-06-23
    The “Philosophy-Ladenness” of Perception.Mika Suojanen - 2018 - Philosophical Inquiry 42 (3-4):83-102.
    The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception. Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the (...)
  13. added 2018-06-23
    A Merleau-Pontian Account of Embodied Perceptual Norms.Corinne Lajoie - 2018 - Ithaque 22:1-19.
    Although philosophers may first find it odd to speak of norms in the context of perception, the argument for normativity finds support in the writings of some of the spearheads of the phenomenological tradition, amongst them Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As Maren Wehrle argues however, a phenomenological analysis of perception’s normative claim requires that we redefine our traditional conception of norms as authoritative standards or prescriptive moral guidelines. To this end, as she points out, the origin of the concept (...)
  14. added 2018-06-23
    Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters.Philipp Berghofer - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (2):145-170.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl’s conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 will be my main resources. My second aim is to demonstrate the currency and relevance of Husserl’s conception. This means two things: Firstly, I will show that in current debates in analytic epistemology there is a movement sharing with Husserl the (...)
  15. added 2018-06-23
    Protention and Predictive Processing: The Wave of the Future.Dan Lloyd - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (1):98-99.
    Gallagher’s main claim can be enhanced neurophenomenologically. In his 1907 lectures Thing and Space, Husserl argued that perception in general is enactive. Moreover, the neuroscientific theory of predictive processing connects neatly to a future-oriented phenomenology.
  16. added 2018-06-23
    How Husserl’s and Searle’s Contextual Model Reformulates the Discussion About the Conceptual Content of Perception.Pol Vandevelde - 2017 - In Roberto Walton, Shigeru Taguchi & Roberto Rubio (eds.), Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Springer International Publishing. pp. 57-76.
  17. added 2018-06-23
    Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology.Roberto Walton, Shigeru Taguchi & Roberto Rubio (eds.) - 2017 - Springer.
  18. added 2018-06-23
    Visual Phenomenology.Michael Madary - 2017 - MIT Press.
    In this book, Michael Madary examines visual experience, drawing on both phenomenological and empirical methods of investigation. He finds that these two approaches—careful, philosophical description of experience and the science of vision—independently converge on the same result: Visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. -/- Madary first makes the case for the descriptive premise, arguing that the phenomenology of vision is best described as on ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. He discusses visual experience as being perspectival, (...)
  19. added 2018-06-23
    Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2017 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 6:58-78.
    Over the past years McDowell’s conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl’s work, arguing that Husserl’s theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of “real content” is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl’s later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell’s theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does not have (...)
  20. added 2018-06-23
    Book Review: Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, Written by Steven Crowell. [REVIEW]Susi Ferrarello - 2014 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 45 (2):251-257.
  21. added 2018-06-23
    La percepción reconducida a la esfera trascendental en Ideas I.Mari Carmen López Sáenz - 2014 - Convivium: revista de filosofía 27:63-87.
    En su Nachwort a Ideas I Husserl asegura que la experiencia directa se sustenta enla subjetividad trascendental. Reafirma así la necesidad de la reducción fenomenológica,establecida en su obra de 1913 para hacer de la fenomenología una ciencia radical.Expondremos qué consecuencias tiene esto para la percepción tal y como es comprendidaen Ideas I, como relación entre la conciencia y lo percibido y, al mismo tiempo, comoexperiencia originaria de la verdad. Este trabajo analiza, en primer lugar, la diferencia de la descripción del (...)
  22. added 2018-06-23
    Sensory Perception and Primary Contents: Husserl's Contribution to the Problem of Consciousness.Denis Fisette - 2014 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 13:36-61.
    My paper is divided into three parts. The first examines the different versions of phenomenology that Husserl used during the Freiburg period, including genetic phenomenology, which is considered, in Experience and Judgment, as the basis for his genealogy of logic. I also examine the doxa-episteme opposition, which is one of the central topics of this book, and I claim that Brentano's epistemic asymmetry between internal and external perception can be considered as a special case of this opposition, which Husserl seeks (...)
  23. added 2018-06-23
    The Teleological Dimension of Perceptual and Motor Intentionality.Bernard Pachoud - 1999 - In Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  24. added 2018-06-23
    I. Miller, Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness. [REVIEW]David Woodruff Smith - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (3):500.
  25. added 2018-06-23
    Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness, by Izchak Miller. [REVIEW]Karl Ameriks - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):414.
  26. added 2018-05-23
    Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality as a Relational Theory.Andrea Marchesi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien (3):343-367.
    _ Source: _Page Count 25 This paper examines Husserl’s theory of intentionality as it is developed in _Logical Investigations_ and other early writings. In Section 1, the author attempts to capture the core of Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Section 2 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the account of intentional relation developed in the fifth _Investigation_. In Section 3, the author tries to flesh out what is meant by the claim in the sixth _Investigation_ that the designation ‘object’ is (...)
  27. added 2018-04-16
    Symbolic Pregnance and Passive Synthesis-Genetic Phenomenology of Perception in Cassirer and Husserl.M. Bosch - 2002 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 109 (1):148-161.
  28. added 2018-03-01
    Phénoménologie de l’élément poétique.Marc Richir - 2008 - Studia Phaenomenologica 8:177-186.
    As a development of his former researches on speech – that he distinguishes from instituted language and that he identifies to thought – the author points out a special kind of fantasy, already observed by Husserl himself: the perceptive Phantasie. Analysed here as a form of transition from perception (Perzeption) to what is impossible to be represented (l’infigurable), this form of fantasy aims at what Winnicot understood as a transitional object. Preceding any intentional and even imaginary foundation (Stiftung), the perceptive (...)
  29. added 2018-02-04
    Pierre-Jean Renaudie, Husserl Et les Catégories: Langage, Pensée, Et Perception. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley - forthcoming - Husserl Studies:1-8.
  30. added 2018-02-04
    Husserl, Impure Intentionalism, and Sensory Awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to (...)
  31. added 2018-02-04
    Husserl on Perceptual Optimality.Maxime Doyon - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (2):171-189.
    The notions of perceptual normativity and optimality have generated much discussion in the last decade or so in the literature on Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s position on the topic has been far less extensively investigated. Surprisingly, however, Husserl wrote a great deal about the question of perceptual optimality. Not only are there a considerable number of important passages scattered throughout the manuscripts, the archive also contains a few important full texts on precisely this issue. Given the role of fulfillment for Husserl’s concept (...)
  32. added 2018-02-04
    La verità e il campo visivo.Barry Smith - 1999 - Paradigmi 17:49-62.
    L'articolo usa la teoria delle parti, del tutto e dei contomi per elaborare alcune relazioni cruciali tra la «psicologia ecologica» di J.J. Gibson e la fenomenologia di Husserl. Presenta, inoltre, una teoria ontologica dei contomi spaziali e delle entita spazialmente estese, applicandola al cam po visivo, qui concepito come un' entita spazialmente estesa dipendente dal soggetto che percepisce. Su questa base e possibile formulare un nuovo tipo di definizione teoretico-correspondentista della verita per gli enunciati del linguaggio naturale.
  33. added 2018-01-05
    Re-Examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical Investigations.Chad Kidd - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this hybrid (...)
  34. added 2017-12-22
    Asjade antusest tajus.Kristjan Laasik - 2013 - Akadeemia (1):104-123.
    Edmund Husserl on tuntud kui fenomenoloogia rajaja ning möödunud sajandi ja käesoleva aja mõjukaimaid filosoofe, seda eriti kontinentaalses, kuid viimasel ajal ka analüütilises traditsioonis. Fenomenoloogia on filosoofia suund, mis uurib seda, kuidas esemed on meile kogemuses antud, laskumata metafüüsilistesse spekulatsioonidesse näiteks selle üle, kas materiaalsed asjad on olemas või mitte meie kogemusest sõltumatult. Niisuguse orientatsiooni raames on Husserl andnud panuseid mitmetesse filosoofilistesse teemadesse; käesolevas artiklis keskendun ma tema tajufilosoofiale, visandades tõlgenduse, milles Husserli käsitlus asjade konstitutsioonist ehk antusest tajus on selgitatud (...)
  35. added 2017-09-17
    Perceptual Error, Conjunctivism, and Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (1):25-45.
    Claude Romano and Andrea Staiti have recently discussed Husserl’s account of perception in relation to debates in current analytic philosophy between so-called “conjunctivists” and “disjunctivists”. Romano and Staiti offer strikingly different accounts of the nature of illusion and hallucination, and opposing readings of Husserl. Romano thinks hallucinations and illusions are fleeting, fragile phenomena, while Staiti claims they are inherently retrospective phenomena. Romano reads Husserl as being committed to a form of conjunctivism that Romano rejects in favour of a version of (...)
  36. added 2017-09-17
    A Brief on Husserl and Bayesian Perceptual Updating.Kenneth Williford - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (5):503-519.
    I aim to provide some evidence that Husserl’s description of perceptual updating actually fits very nicely into the Bayesian Brain paradigm, articulated by Karl Friston and others, and that that paradigm, in turn, can be taken as an excellent example of “Neurophenomenology”. The apparently un-phenomenological Helmholtzian component of the Bayesian Brain paradigm, according to which what one consciously seems to see is a product of unconscious causal reasoning to the best explanation of one’s sensory stimulations, can be finessed, I claim, (...)
  37. added 2017-09-17
    Husserl on Perception: A Nonrepresentationalism That Nearly Was.Matt Bower - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1768-1790.
    There is a longstanding debate among Husserl scholars about whether Husserl thinks perception involves mental representation. The debate, I believe, has not been settled. I deny that the existentialist-inspired charge of representationalism about perception in Husserl is precise enough to stick. Given a clearer understanding of just what mental representation amounts to, I contend that those who defend Husserl against the accusation of representationalism fare little better than Husserl's existentialist-leaning critics. I argue that he is in fact a representationalist about (...)
  38. added 2017-09-17
    Je suis éveillée: Husserl sur l’attention et l’éveil.Hanne Jacobs - 2016 - Intellectica 66:37-56.
    L’article présente une reconstruction d’analyse husserlienne de l’éveil et démontre que, selon Husserl, seule une phénoménologie de l’attention est en mesure d’élucider les véritables caractéristiques de l’état d’éveil. Plus précisément, l’article démontre que, d’un point de vue husserlien, l’attention introduit une distinction entre thème et arrière-plan dans notre expérience et que cette différence est ce qui nous permettra de déterminer dans quelle mesure nous ne sommes jamais pleinement éveillés lorsque nous sommes éveillés (section 1 et 2), comment le sommeil au (...)
  39. added 2017-08-10
    Michael Madary, Visual Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  40. added 2017-04-21
    Making Sense of the Lived Body and the Lived World: Meaning and Presence in Husserl, Derrida and Noë.Jacob Martin Rump - 2018 - Continental Philosophy Review 51 (2):141-167.
    I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend (...)
  41. added 2017-04-10
    The Sense of Life: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty Touching and Being Touched.Jenny Slatman - 2005 - Chiasmi International 7:305-324.
  42. added 2017-04-10
    Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl’s Analysis of “Nature-Thing” in Ideas II.Panos Theodorou - 2005 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 5:165-187.
  43. added 2017-04-10
    Perception et négation: Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty.Pavlos Kontos - 1995 - Études Phénoménologiques 11 (22):51-80.
  44. added 2017-04-10
    Things and God: On Infinity and Transcendence in Husserl.Mary Jeanne Larrabee - 1982 - New Scholasticism 56 (3):323-328.
  45. added 2017-04-01
    Percezione, Motivazione, Esistenza. Intenzionalità E Costituzione Nella Prima Fenomenologia Husserliana (1898-1921).Andrea Marchesi - 2017 - Dissertation, Università Degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
    The present work is a systematic study of the nexus which holds together perception, motivation and existence in Husserl’s early writings—precisely those which are dated between 1898 and 1921. In Chapter I a historical and conceptual reconstruction of the genesis of what is termed ‘constitution problem’ is provided. After a thorough discussion about the distinction between real and intentional description, we elucidate the method of phenomenological reduction and show how the constitution problem relates to questions regarding transcendence and existence. Chapter (...)
  46. added 2017-03-28
    Husserl et les catégories. Langage, pensée, perception.Pierre-Jean Renaudie - 2015 - Paris: Vrin.
    The purpose of this book is to investigate the roots of phenomenology and to analyse, from a historical and systematic point of view, the reasons that enabled Husserl to set down in his Logical Investigations the conditions of a strictly descriptive philosophy. The ‘breakthrough’ of phenomenology was made possible by Husserl’s investigations on the specificity of logical forms, and was grounded upon his ability to establish in the Logical Investigations a descriptive distinction between sensitive and categorial forms. Such distinction allows (...)
  47. added 2017-03-27
    Contenido, sensación y percepción.Olga Fernández Prat - 2008 - Critica 40 (120):37-65.
    Este artículo pretende clarificar la relación entre los aspectos sensoriales de la percepción y el aspecto "demostrativo" sobre el que han llamado la atención autores como Evans y McDowell. Tras introducir un análisis husserliano en espíritu de los modos de presentación demostrativo-perceptuales, y con base en una versión de la teoría de los datos sensoriales -sin los defectos que la han hecho impopular recientemente entre los filósofos- se proponen correspondencias entre la "fase sensorial" y la "fase demostrativo-conceptual" de la percepción, (...)
  48. added 2017-03-10
    The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy.Marco Cavallaro - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (2):162-177.
    Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...)
  49. added 2017-03-06
    Ist Die Empfindung Intentional?: Der Brentanosche Hintergrund Einer Kritik Husserls.Ion Tănăsescu - 2003 - Studia Phaenomenologica 3 (1/2):75-97.
  50. added 2017-03-06
    Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception.Dagfinn Føllesdal - 1978 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 5:83-94.
    The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion of hyle, whose (...)
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