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Continental Philosophy > Phenomenology > Edmund Husserl > Husserl: Philosophy of Mind > Husserl: Perception
Husserl: Perception
Edited by Kristjan Laasik (Zhejiang University)
About this topic
| Summary | Husserl’s first-personal view of perceptual experience furnishes a principled alternative to current mainstream views. On the Husserlian view, perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions, rather than accuracy conditions. We perceive objects in terms of possibilities of degrees and kinds of fulfillment, i.e., better and more complete givenness, as when I examine an object from different sides, to attain a more complete overview. The idea of fulfillment also yields a non-inferential conception of how perceptual experiences justify beliefs or judgments: if I believe that there is a blackbird in the tree and then see that there is one, the two acts enter into a synthesis of fulfillment, providing justification for the belief. Lastly, the focus on fulfillments brings center-stage perceivers' embodiment, with the body’s kinaesthetic systems taking on a constitutive role in visual and other perceptual experiences. |
| Key works | Parts of the classic Tugendhat 1967 discuss perceptual experiences in relation to the topics of fulfillment and truth. Mensch 1981, taking Husserl’s rejection of psychologism as starting point, explores the relations perceptual experiences bear to the world and to the cognitive states (or “acts”) they justify, in the Logical Investigations and Ideas I. Melle 1983 argues that Husserl, unlike Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, has a “meaning-theoretic” and “intellectualist” conception of the perceptual noema. Miller 1984 discusses Husserl's views of perceptual experiences, including the perception of time, from the point of view of the so-called West Coast interpretation, incorporating Fregean motifs. Mulligan 1995 compares Husserl’s views of perceptual experiences with those of the Gestalt psychologists, and examines Husserl's uses of the notion of “apprehension,” regarding perceptual experiences. Hopp 2011 draws upon Husserl’s views of perception and fulfillment to contribute to current debates on perceptual justification, viewing fulfillment as a kind of non-inferential perceptual justification, and taking perceptual contents as non-conceptual. Another recent contribution is Borsato 2009, considering inner and outer perception vis-à-vis imagination, and examining the relations between Brentano’s and Husserl’s views. Bernet 1978 |
| Introductions | Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 4, Woodruff Smith 2006, Ch. 6 |
Show all references
Related
Siblings
- Husserl: Consciousness (682 | 1)
- Husserl: Intentionality (1,068 | 2)
- Husserl: Intersubjectivity (430)
- Husserl: The Self (264 | 6)
- Husserl: Embodiment and Action (248)
- Husserl: Phenomenology (1,758 | 296)
- Husserl: Emotions and Feelings (26)
- Husserl: Imagination (265)
- Husserl: Philosophy of Mind, Misc (461)
Contents
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| 1 — 50 / 330 |
- Veridical Perceptual Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.What is the epistemic significance of taking a veridical perceptual experience at face value? To first approximations, the Minimal View says that it is true belief, and the Maximal View says that it is knowledge. I sympathetically explore the prospects of the Maximal View.
- Are there irrational perceptual experiences?Kristjan Laasik - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.I argue that there are no irrational visual experiences, if we mean just the experiences that one is having now, but there are irrational visual experiences, if we mean also the experiences that one has had in the past. In other words, I will be arguing that perceptual irrationality is a retrospective phenomenon. So as to further support the first conjunct of my thesis, and to contextualize it among contemporary discussions, I also critique Susanna Siegel’s proposal that one could be (...)
- Demystifying mind-independence.Kristjan Laasik - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (1):25-45.Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, (...)
- A Husserlian Approach to Affectivity and Temporality in Affordance Perception.Juan Diego Bogotá & Giuseppe Flavio Artese - 2022 - In Affordances in Everyday Life. A Multidisciplinary Collection of Essays. Cham: Springer. pp. 181-190.Gibson defined affordances as action possibilities directly offered to an animal by the environment. Ambitiously, affordances are meant to show the inadequacy of the subjective-objective dichotomy in the study of cognition. Armed with similar concerns, some neo-Gibsonians recently thought of affordances as latent dispositions existing independently of individual organisms or whole species. It is no coincidence that critics had, on several occasions, objected that this theoretical stance dramatically neglects the role of the perceiver in the emergence of affordances. In this (...)
- Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):755-777.European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.
- Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):755-777.European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.
- The Origin of the Phenomenology of Attention.Thomas Byrne - 2022 - Research in Phenomenology 52 (3):425-441.This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I unpack Husserl’s analysis of interest from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest” to demonstrate that it comprises his first rigorous genetic analysis of attention. Specifically, I explore Husserl’s observations about how attentive interest is passively guided by affections, moods, habits, and cognitive tensions. In doing so, I reveal that the early Husserl described attention as always pulled forward to new discoveries via the rhythmic recurrence of tension and pleasure. (...)
- Husserl, hallucination, and intentionality.Andrea Cimino - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-33.There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The problem of hallucination has de facto generated contrasting accounts of perception, led to opposing epistemic and metaphysical positions, and, most significantly, exposed a manifold of diverging views concerning the intentionality of experience, in general, and perceptual intentionality, in particular. In this article, I aim to clarify the controversial status, experiential possibility, and intentional structure of hallucination qua distinctive phenomenon. The analysis will first detect a phenomenological, (...)
- Corijn van Mazijk, Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell New York and London, Routledge, 2020, pp. xviii + 174.Danilo Manca - 2022 - Studi di Estetica 22.
- Hubris and Humility: Husserl’s Reduction and Givenness.Timothy Mooney - 2022 - In Ian Leask & Eoin Cassidy (eds.), Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion. Fordham University Press. pp. 47-68.In this chapter I contend that Husserl’s investigations of reduction and givenness culminate in a hubris and a humility that are not precisely where Marion might look for them. In the first section of this essay I set out the main points in Marion’s reading of Husserl. I begin by outlining the broadening and breakthrough achieved in the early work, and then consider the shift that Marion sees presaged in the principle of all principles and announced in the reduction. On (...)
- Phenomenologists on Perception and Hallucination: Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (8):e12861.There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and ‘conjunctivists’ (intentionalists), on the other. For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are to be located vis-à-vis this chasm. While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau-Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.
- Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and experience.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):583-602.In this paper, I compare various theories of perception in relation to the question of the epistemological and ontological status of the qualities that appear in perceptual experience. I group these theories into two main views: quality externalism and quality internalism, and I highlight their contrasting problems in accounting for phenomena such as perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations. Then, I propose an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism and which conceives of the subject and the object of perceptual experience (...)
- La perception est-elle intentionnelle?Claude Romano - 2022 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 78 (3):647-672.In this article, Claude Romano challenges one of the more widespread assumptions in the phenomenological school, and especially in Husserl and his disciples, that of the intentional character of perception. Not denying that perception could have some aspects that are intentional, he claims that perception is not an intentional relation to the world. Indeed, intentionality is a basic feature of mind that remains connected to a form of representationalism. Now, as Heidegger has suggested with his concept of In-der-Welt-sein, and as (...)
- Kinaesthesis Revisited: Kinaesthetic Sensation and its Temporal Asymmetry.Nikos Soueltzis - 2022 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 54 (1):71-90.The hyletic component of kinaesthetic sensation has generally been treated with suspicion. It is usually set aside in favour of Husserl’s later analysis of kinaesthetic experience which emphasizes its practical dimension. I try to show that a nuanced understanding of the hyletic component allows us to consider its deeper temporal function. From a rather neglected passage in his Ding und Raum I show that Husserl was aware of the temporal peculiarity of kinaesthetic sensation: it is characterized by a unique kind (...)
- The Debate About Non-Conceptual Content Revisited: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, by Corijn van Mazijk, London, Routledge, 2020, xviii + 174 pp., $128.00 (hbk), ISBN: 978-0-367-44180-7.Robert Hanna - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (1):90-115.Philosophical discussions, especially in professional academic philosophy, all-too-often are, or anyhow quickly devolve into, nothing but essentially humanly irrelevant, esoteric, logic-chopping, t...
- Perceptual confidence: A Husserlian take.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):354-364.In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, i.e., confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, e.g., for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like (...)
- Review of Michael Madary’s Visual Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Husserl Studies 38 (1):97-105.In his remarkable book, Visual Phenomenology, Michael Madary argues for the claim that “visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment” (Madary 2017, p. 3), by drawing upon lines of evidence from Husserlian phenomenology, philosophy of perception, and the cognitive sciences. While he considers Edmund Husserl as a major influence upon his ideas, he does not aim to adhere to Husserl’s views in every regard, but instead to develop Husserl-inspired views of his own, muster support for them, and (...)
- Constancy and Constitution.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):781-798.I argue for the following claims: (1) A core Husserlian account of perceptual constancy needs to be given in terms of indicative future-oriented conditionals but can be complemented by a counterfactual account; (2) thus conceived, constancy is a necessary aspect of content. I speak about a “core Husserlian” account so as to capture certain ideas that Michael Madary has presented as the core of Edmund Husserl's approach to perceptual constancy, viz., that “perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of (...)
- Corijn van Mazijk: Perception and reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, New York: Routledge, 2020, 192 pp., ISBN 978-0-367-44180-7, ISBN 978-1-003-01022-7. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 55 (1):119-123.Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots of McDowell’s (...)
- learning to see others. Perception, Types, and Position-Taking in Husserl’s Phenomenology.Elisa Magrì - 2021 - In Elisa Magrì & Anna Bortolan (eds.), Empathy, Intersubjectivity, and the Social World: The Continued Relevance of Phenomenology. Essays in Honour of Dermot Moran. Degruyter. pp. 261-278.$89.89 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation
Bookmark 2 citations - Sonic Environments as Systems of Places: A Critical Reading of Husserl’s Thing and Space.Martin Nitsche - 2021 - Open Philosophy 4 (1):136-148.This article offers a thorough and critical reading of Husserl’s Thing and Space. This reading is principally motivated by the effort to methodologically design a phenomenological–topological approach to the research of lived sonic environments. In this book, Husserl lays foundations of phenomenological topology by understanding perceptions as places and defining, consequently, the space as a system of places. The critical reading starts with pointing out the ambiguity of location in Thing and Space, which consists mainly in the insufficient implementation of (...)
- Percepción y conceptos: McDowell y Husserl sobre los contenidos de la experiencia.Carlota Serrahima - 2021 - Investigaciones Fenomenológicas 5:311.En este artículo se presentan algunas consideraciones relativas al debate sobre si el contenido de la experiencia perceptiva es o no conceptual. En particular, se pretende formular una crítica general al proyecto conceptualista de John McDowell apelando a algunas de sus asunciones de fondo –asunciones relativas a los requisitos que toda teoría sobre la relación entre percepción y juicio ha de cumplir, y que en su caso le conducen a considerar necesaria la tesis de que los contenidos de la percepción (...)
- Painful Experience and Constitution of the Intersubjective Self: A Critical-Phenomenological Analysis.Jessica Stanier & Nicole Miglio - 2021 - In Susi Ferrarello (ed.), Phenomenology of Bioethics: Technoethics and Lived Experience. Springer. pp. 101-114.In this paper, we discuss how phenomenology might cogently express the way painful experiences are layered with complex intersubjective meaning. In particular, we propose a critical conception of pain as an intricate multi-levelled phenomenon, deeply ingrained in the constitution of one’s sense of bodily self and emerging from a web of intercorporeal, social, cultural, and political relations. In the first section, we review and critique some conceptual accounts of pain. Then, we explore how pain is involved in complex ways with (...)$109.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 1 citation
- The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.Roi Bar - 2020 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28 (1):53-72.Phenomenology is not dead yet, at least not from the viewpoint of the “phenomenology-friendly”approach to the mind that has recently emerged in cognitive science: the “enactive approach” or “enactivism.” This approach takes the mental capacities, such as perception, consciousness and cognition, to be the result of the interaction between the brain, the body and the environment. In this, it offers an alternative to reductionist explanations of the mental in terms of brain activities, like cognitivism, especially computationalism, while overcoming the Cartesian (...)
- Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1):85-108.Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness (...)
- Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.Several commentators have recently attributed conflicting accounts of the relation between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination to Husserl. Some say he is a proponent of the conjunctive view that the two kinds of experience are fundamentally the same. Others deny this and purport to find in Husserl distinct and non-overlapping accounts of their fundamental natures, thus committing him to a disjunctive view. My goal is to set the record straight. Having briefly laid out the problem under discussion and the terms (...)
- Husserl’s 1901 and 1913 Philosophies of Perceptual Occlusion: Signitive, Empty, and Dark Intentions.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (2):123-139.This paper examines the evolution of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perceptual occlusion. This task is accomplished in two stages. First, I elucidate Husserl’s conclusion, from his 1901 Logical Investigations, that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by partial signitive acts. I focus on two doctrines of that account. I examine Husserl’s insight that signitive intentions are composed of Gehalt and I discuss his conclusion that signitive intentions sit on the continuum of fullness. Second, the paper discloses how Husserl (...)
- Review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell. [REVIEW]Tony Cheng - 2020 - Phenomenological Reviews 6.
- Husserl’s philosophical estrangement from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate.Andrea Cimino - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):743-779.Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a ‘phenomenology of sense-deception.’ On the other hand, it has generated contrasting—if not utterly incompatible—readings of Husserl’s own account of sense perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl’s reflection on sensory perception, and highlights the (...)
- Asunto de abstracción o de carácter: Husserl y Brentano en torno a la Wahrnehmungsvorstellung y la Phantasievorstellung.Felipe Guerrero Cordero - 2020 - Hybris, Revista de FilosofíA 11 (2):289-313.The distinction between perception and fantasy is not a cliché among others. Tracing the path to its correct elaboration even allows us to think this distinction as the engine of the early Husserlian phenomenology. For this reason, this brief article aims to contrast Brentano and Husserl's vision of this subject. For the former, fantasy is an improper representation [Vorstellung] with an intuitive nucleus; for the latter, it has a properly intuitive character. In this transit, it will be shown that this (...)
- Correction to: Bar, Roi. The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.Scott Davidson - 2020 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28 (1).A correction has been made to: Bar, Roi. The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, v. 28, n. 1, p. 53-72, june 2020.The incorrect abstract was included with the original publication of DOI 10.5195/jffp.2020.928The original article has been updated to reflect this change.
- Van Mazijk, Corijn: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell.Maxime Doyon - 2020 - Husserl Studies 37 (1):93-101.
- Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.One of Edmund Husserl's theoretical priorities throughout his philosophical career was to understand the nature of perceptual experience. His analyses of perceptual experience had a profound impact on subsequent thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, such as Aron Gurwitsch and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Naturally, his account of perception remains a topic of discussion among Husserl scholars. Despite the attention it has received over many decades, Husserl interpreters diverge considerably in how they understand his views and their relation to current debates in the (...)
- Bodily expressions, feelings, and the direct perception account of social cognition.Francesca Forlè - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):1019-1034.In this paper, I will argue in favor of a direct perception account of social cognition, focusing on the idea that we can directly grasp at least some mental states of others through their bodily expressions. I will investigate the way we should consider expressions and their relations to mental phenomena in order to defend DP. In order to do so, I will present Krueger and Overgaard’s idea of expressions as constitutive proper parts of the mental phenomena expressed and I (...)
- The phenomenology of pain.Saulius Geniusas - 2020 - Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.The Phenomenology of Pain is the first book-length investigation of its topic to appear in English. Groundbreaking, systematic, and illuminating, it opens a dialogue between phenomenology and such disciplines as cognitive science and cultural anthropology to argue that science alone cannot clarify the nature of pain experience without incorporating a phenomenological approach. Building on this premise, Saulius Geniusas develops a novel conception of pain grounded in phenomenological principles: pain is an aversive bodily feeling with a distinct experiential quality, which can (...)
- Color as a problem of phenomenological aesthetics.Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kormin - 2020 - Философия И Культура 9:9-33.The aim of the study is to clarify the aesthetic concept of color perception from the phenomenological reasoning of Edmund Husserl. Today, the orientation diagram of the field of phenomenological research is formed in various zones: from theological to naturalistic. In which of these zones the structures of the phenomenological analysis of color are located is not an easy question. The coloristic region is constituted according to the degree of consciousness, including aesthetic consciousness. It is extremely difficult to meet with (...)
- Recalcitrant Emotions: A Phenomenological View.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Problemos 97.In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without contradiction” which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The (...)
- The Intentionality of Perception: An Updated Husserlian Approach.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang University Press.In my book, I argue that there is reason to adopt a kind of updated Husserlian approach to perceptual intentionality, viz., based on the idea that perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions. Drawing upon the ideas of the renowned German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), I bring center-stage the notion of perceptual fulfillment, a kind of non-inferential confirmation, which may take place as part the ongoing perceptual experience. Thus, when looking at a red tomato, I may anticipate that if I turn it (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Kinesthetic Unity as Motivated Association.Andrea Lanza - 2020 - Gestalt Theory 42 (3):271-286.Summary Within Husserl’s theory of perception, the role attributed to kinesthetic sensations determines a phase of the perceptive constitution that marks the boundary between pure receptivity and a first form of self-determination of consciousness. Kinesthetic experiences are, in fact, characterized not just as acts that are performed but rather that can be performed, albeit according to predetermined paths. This primitive form of ‘instinctive’ spontaneity of the Ego (linked to primal impulses) as realization of pre-established potentialities, characterizes what Husserl defines the (...)
- Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and Mcdowell.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2020 - New York: Routledge.How does perception give us access to external reality? This book critically engages with John McDowell's conceptualist answer to this question, by offering a new exploration of his views on perception and reality in relation to those of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In six chapters, the book examines these thinkers' respective theories of perception, lucidly describing how they fit within their larger philosophical views on mind and reality. It thereby not only reveals the continuity of a tradition that underlies (...)
- Imagination and Its Critical Dimension – Lived Possibilities and An Other Kind of Otherwise.Andreea Smaranda Aldea - 2019 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 2 (XVII):ch. 14.Following Husserl’s analyses of perception and imagination, the paper introduces two basic modes of intelligibility – the normalizing and the imagining – and argues that they are deeply intertwined, despite radical qualitative differences between them. What sets these two modes apart are their distinctive teleological orientations. To show this, the paper looks closely at the ways in which we experience difference in these respective modes. This discussion requires, however, that we challenge Husserl’s own framework for analyzing the imagination, which emerges (...)
- Les frontières entre réel et imaginaire à l’épreuve des promenades sonores in situ.Lucia Angelino - 2019 - Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 12 (1):189-203.This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff’s Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such (...)
- Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...)
- The Sense of Deception: Illusion and Hallucination as Nullified, Invalid Perception.Andrea Cimino - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (1):27-49.The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucination and disclose the significance of sense-deception in Husserl’s phenomenology. By clarifying the relation between the “leibhaftige presence” and “existence” of perceived objects, I shall be able to contend that illusion and hallucination are nullified, invalid perceptions. Non-existence or in-actuality is a form of invalidity: the Ungültigkeit of what demands its insertion in the totality of actual existence. Husserl elaborates an ex-negativo account of in-actuality, in which sensory deception (...)
- D'une phénoménologie du visible à une ontologie phénoménologique de l'invisible: perception et sensation chez Husserl et Henry: recherche sur l'origine du sens.Weifeng Cui - 2019 - [Louvain-La-Neuve]: PUL, Presses universitaires de Louvain.Dans un dialogue constant avec la phénoménologie intentionnelle de Husserl, Michel Henry a tenté de mettre au point une nouvelle ontologie phénoménologique, pour cerner spécifiquement ce qu'il nommait «l’essence de la manifestation». Il ouvrait ainsi la voie d’une méthode philosophique originale, celle d’une phénoménologie «radicale», dont il ne cessa de l’appliquer à des objets divers, dans le cadre précis des pensées de l’immanence. Ce livre interroge ce moment de l’élaboration phénoménologique de la philosophie de Michel Henry et montre notamment comment (...)
- Zeichenhorizonte: semiotische Strukturen in Husserls Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung.Diego D’Angelo - 2019 - Cham: Springer.In diesem Band deckt Diego D'Angelo semiotische Strukturen in der Husserl’schen Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung auf. Ist es der Phänomenologie darum zu tun, die Erfahrung von Dingen in unserer Umwelt zu beschreiben, so ist dabei der Begriff des Horizontes von zentraler Bedeutung: Was wir unmittelbar wahrnehmen, verweist immer schon auf anderes, was nur „mitgegeben“ ist. Wenn wir Dinge wahrnehmen, haben wir nur eine bestimmte Perspektive, d.h. wir sehen lediglich einen Aspekt. Aber wir nehmen immer ganze Gegenstände wahr (wir sehen Tische und (...)
- Maxime Doyon and Thiemo Breyer: Normativity in Perception. [REVIEW]Zack Hugo - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (3):275-285.
- Re-examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical Investigations.Chad Kidd - 2019 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 101 (3):407-444.A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this hybrid (...)
- Distant Things: A Closer Look.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (3):249-263.In a discussion of the constitutive role of colour in our visual perceptual experiences, Wilhelm Schapp centrally argues that we cannot visually perceive certain distant things, like a house seen far down in the valley. My main contention is that, in cases relevantly similar to Schapp’s, we do perceptually experience distant things, viz., as drastically “decayed” things, which are part of distant scenes. In doing so, we adopt towards them a kind of conservative “attitude.” The ideas of decay and scenicness (...)
- Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):402-427.Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, i.e., “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (p. 520). However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to follow, Horgan and (...)
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