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Summary

Husserl’s first-personal view of perceptual experience furnishes a principled alternative to current mainstream views. On the Husserlian view, perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions, rather than accuracy conditions. We perceive objects in terms of possibilities of degrees and kinds of fulfillment, i.e., better and more complete givenness, as when I examine an object from different sides, to attain a more complete overview. The idea of fulfillment also yields a non-inferential conception of how perceptual experiences justify beliefs or judgments: if I believe that there is a blackbird in the tree and then see that there is one, the two acts enter into a synthesis of fulfillment, providing justification for the belief. Lastly, the focus on fulfillments brings center-stage perceivers' embodiment, with the body’s kinaesthetic systems taking on a constitutive role in visual and other perceptual experiences.

Key works Parts of the classic Tugendhat 1967 discuss perceptual experiences in relation to the topics of fulfillment and truth. Mensch 1981, taking Husserl’s rejection of psychologism as starting point, explores the relations perceptual experiences bear to the world and to the cognitive states (or “acts”) they justify, in the Logical Investigations and Ideas I. Melle 1983 argues that Husserl, unlike Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, has a “meaning-theoretic” and “intellectualist” conception of the perceptual noema. Miller 1984 discusses Husserl's views of perceptual experiences, including the perception of time, from the point of view of the so-called West Coast interpretation, incorporating Fregean motifs. Mulligan 1995 compares Husserl’s views of perceptual experiences with those of the Gestalt psychologists, and examines Husserl's uses of the notion of “apprehension,” regarding perceptual experiences. Hopp 2011 draws upon Husserl’s views of perception and fulfillment to contribute to current debates on perceptual justification, viewing fulfillment as a kind of non-inferential perceptual justification, and taking perceptual contents as non-conceptual. Another recent contribution is Borsato 2009, considering inner and outer perception vis-à-vis imagination, and examining the relations between Brentano’s and Husserl’s views. Bernet 1978
Introductions Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 4, Woodruff Smith 2006, Ch. 6
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  1. Observing Mythical Entities.Andrea Altobrando - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (3):302-335.
    Sellars has taught us that we do not have direct epistemic access to sense data. Therefore, the latter cannot work as the bedrock of our knowledge. At the same time, through the myth of genius Jones, Sellars has tried to explain how we become able to rationally refer to sense data. What is more, it even seems that, following Jones’ teachings, the Rylean folk have become able to observe sense data. How could this be possible if sense data are merely (...)
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  2. Husserl’s Phenomenalism: A Rejoinder to the Philipse-Zahavi Debate.Philippe Setlakwe Blouin - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (3):241-261.
    The present paper explores anew the question of Husserl’s metaphysics by contrasting H. Philipse and D. Zahavi’s respective position on the matter. I argue that these positions fall victim to opposing exegetical pitfalls. On the one hand, while I concur with Philipse’s general characterisation of Husserl as an ontological phenomenalist, I disagree that this implies Husserl was a subjective idealist similar to Berkeley. On the other hand, while Zahavi’s correlationist interpretation of Husserl avoids this subjective idealist interpretation, I argue that (...)
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  3. Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience.Matt E. M. Bower - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (2):161-178.
    Interpretations abound about Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl’s view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, (...)
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  4. Veridical Perceptual Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    What is the epistemic significance of taking a veridical perceptual experience at face value? To first approximations, the Minimal View says that it is true belief, and the Maximal View says that it is knowledge. I sympathetically explore the prospects of the Maximal View.
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  5. Does Hallie See a White Cup on a Desk? A Phenomenological Account of Hallucination Indiscriminability.Hicham Jakha - 2023 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 71 (3):183-203.
    In this paper, I argue for phenomenology, Husserlian phenomenology to be precise, as providing a solid paradigm on how to determine and assess hallucination. To be more explicit, in the context of my deliberations, I analyze Susanna Schellenberg’s arguments for “phenomenal” evidence and “factive” evidence, as regards her evidential theory of perception. To pinpoint the inadequacies raised in her account of (the hallucinating) Hallie and (the veridically perceiving) Percy sharing any kind of evidence, I propose Edmund Husserl’s epistemic fulfillment as (...)
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  6. Demystifying mind-independence.Kristjan Laasik - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (1):25-45.
    Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, (...)
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  7. Husserl and Disjunctivism: Reply to Bower.Søren Overgaard - 2023 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 61 (3):499-513.
    Abstractabstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.
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  8. What about synesthesia? A phenomenological analysis of a perceptual phenomenon.Lanei Rodemeyer - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1):39-49.
    Synesthesia is occasionally offered as a challenge to Husserl's claims that the sense fields are necessarily distinct. This article demonstrates how synesthesia can be approached through phenomenology. We begin with a review of synesthesia and a brief discussion of how a phenomenological analysis of synesthesia could be productive both for those who experience synesthesia and for phenomenologists. We then shift to analyses of synesthesia through Husserl's notions of association and affectivity, and in light of intersubjective communication. While synesthesia might lead (...)
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  9. Kinaesthesis Revisited: Kinaesthetic Sensation and its Temporal Asymmetry.Nikos Soueltzis - 2023 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 54 (1):71-90.
    The hyletic component of kinaesthetic sensation has generally been treated with suspicion. It is usually set aside in favour of Husserl’s later analysis of kinaesthetic experience which emphasizes its practical dimension. I try to show that a nuanced understanding of the hyletic component allows us to consider its deeper temporal function. From a rather neglected passage in his Ding und Raum I show that Husserl was aware of the temporal peculiarity of kinaesthetic sensation: it is characterized by a unique kind (...)
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  10. A Husserlian Approach to Affectivity and Temporality in Affordance Perception.Juan Diego Bogotá & Giuseppe Flavio Artese - 2022 - In Affordances in Everyday Life. A Multidisciplinary Collection of Essays. Cham: Springer. pp. 181-190.
    Gibson defined affordances as action possibilities directly offered to an animal by the environment. Ambitiously, affordances are meant to show the inadequacy of the subjective-objective dichotomy in the study of cognition. Armed with similar concerns, some neo-Gibsonians recently thought of affordances as latent dispositions existing independently of individual organisms or whole species. It is no coincidence that critics had, on several occasions, objected that this theoretical stance dramatically neglects the role of the perceiver in the emergence of affordances. In this (...)
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  11. Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):755-777.
    One key difference between perceptual experience and thought is the distinctly sensory way perception presents things to us. Some philosophers nevertheless suggest this sensory phenomenal character does not exhaust the way things are made manifest to us in perceptual experience. Edmund Husserl maintains that there is also a significant non‐sensory side to perception's phenomenal character. We may experience, for instance, an object's facing surface in a sensory mode and, as part of the same perceptual experience, also that object's out‐of‐view surface (...)
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  12. The Origin of the Phenomenology of Attention.Thomas Byrne - 2022 - Research in Phenomenology 52 (3):425-441.
    This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I unpack Husserl’s analysis of interest from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest” to demonstrate that it comprises his first rigorous genetic analysis of attention. Specifically, I explore Husserl’s observations about how attentive interest is passively guided by affections, moods, habits, and cognitive tensions. In doing so, I reveal that the early Husserl described attention as always pulled forward to new discoveries via the rhythmic recurrence of tension and pleasure. (...)
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  13. Husserl, hallucination, and intentionality.Andrea Cimino - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-33.
    There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The problem of hallucination has de facto generated contrasting accounts of perception, led to opposing epistemic and metaphysical positions, and, most significantly, exposed a manifold of diverging views concerning the intentionality of experience, in general, and perceptual intentionality, in particular. In this article, I aim to clarify the controversial status, experiential possibility, and intentional structure of hallucination qua distinctive phenomenon. The analysis will first detect a phenomenological, (...)
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  14. Are there irrational perceptual experiences?Kristjan Laasik - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    I argue that there are no irrational visual experiences, if we mean just the experiences that one is having now, but there are irrational visual experiences, if we mean also the experiences that one has had in the past. In other words, I will be arguing that perceptual irrationality is a retrospective phenomenon. So as to further support the first conjunct of my thesis, and to contextualize it among contemporary discussions, I also critique Susanna Siegel’s proposal that one could be (...)
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  15. Corijn van Mazijk, Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell New York and London, Routledge, 2020, pp. xviii + 174.Danilo Manca - 2022 - Studi di Estetica 22.
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  16. The Problem of the Categorial in the Phenomenological Analysis of Perception: Husserl and Heidegger.Ekaterina Melnikova - 2022 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 11 (2):641-665.
    The article aims to show that the task of grounding categorial constituents in the specific founded acts of perception yields the problem field of phenomenological inquiry, within the framework of which remains Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. To achieve this goal the article reconstructs, first, the problem of the possibility of a priori correspondence between meaning and intuition of the intentional act; second, the phenomenological justification of extension of the traditional concept of truth, as a result of which truth characteristic (...)
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  17. Hubris and Humility: Husserl’s Reduction and Givenness.Timothy Mooney - 2022 - In Ian Leask & Eoin Cassidy (eds.), Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion. Fordham University Press. pp. 47-68.
    In this chapter I contend that Husserl’s investigations of reduction and givenness culminate in a hubris and a humility that are not precisely where Marion might look for them. In the first section of this essay I set out the main points in Marion’s reading of Husserl. I begin by outlining the broadening and breakthrough achieved in the early work, and then consider the shift that Marion sees presaged in the principle of all principles and announced in the reduction. On (...)
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  18. Phenomenologists on Perception and Hallucination: Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (8):e12861.
    There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and ‘conjunctivists’ (intentionalists), on the other. For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty are to be located vis‐à‐vis this chasm. While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau‐Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.
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  19. Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and experience.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):583-602.
    In this paper, I compare various theories of perception in relation to the question of the epistemological and ontological status of the qualities that appear in perceptual experience. I group these theories into two main views: quality externalism and quality internalism, and I highlight their contrasting problems in accounting for phenomena such as perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations. Then, I propose an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism and which conceives of the subject and the object of perceptual experience (...)
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  20. La perception est-elle intentionnelle?Claude Romano - 2022 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 78 (3):647-672.
    In this article, Claude Romano challenges one of the more widespread assumptions in the phenomenological school, and especially in Husserl and his disciples, that of the intentional character of perception. Not denying that perception could have some aspects that are intentional, he claims that perception is not an intentional relation to the world. Indeed, intentionality is a basic feature of mind that remains connected to a form of representationalism. Now, as Heidegger has suggested with his concept of In-der-Welt-sein, and as (...)
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  21. Seeing Ghosts. Apperception, Accordance and the Mode of Living Presence in Perception.Poljanšek Tom - 2022 - In Breyer Thiemo, Cavallaro Marco & Sandoval Rodrigo Y. (eds.), Phenomenology of Phantasy and Emotion. Darmstadt: WBG. pp. 145-180.
    Based on Husserl’s distinction between mode of living presence (Modus der Leibhaftigkeit) and mode of certainty (Glaubensmodus der Gewißheit), which coincide in normal univocal perception, the paper argues for a distinction between two different types of accordance (Einstimmigkeit) in perceptual experience – local accordance and global accordance. While local accordance is characterized by the unfolding of appearances in agreement with lines of accordance instituted by recent perceptual apprehensions within a certain spatio-temporal domain, global accordance is characterized by the agreement between (...)
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  22. Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):755-777.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.
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  23. The Debate About Non-Conceptual Content Revisited: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, by Corijn van Mazijk, London, Routledge, 2020, xviii + 174 pp., $128.00 (hbk), ISBN: 978-0-367-44180-7.Robert Hanna - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (1):90-115.
    Philosophical discussions, especially in professional academic philosophy, all-too-often are, or anyhow quickly devolve into, nothing but essentially humanly irrelevant, esoteric, logic-chopping, t...
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  24. Review of Michael Madary’s Visual Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Husserl Studies 38 (1):97-105.
    In his remarkable book, Visual Phenomenology, Michael Madary argues for the claim that “visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment” (Madary 2017, p. 3), by drawing upon lines of evidence from Husserlian phenomenology, philosophy of perception, and the cognitive sciences. While he considers Edmund Husserl as a major influence upon his ideas, he does not aim to adhere to Husserl’s views in every regard, but instead to develop Husserl-inspired views of his own, muster support for them, and (...)
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  25. Perspectivity and Rationality of Perception.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Dialectica 75 (1).
    Susanna Schellenberg has presented several arguments for the "situation-dependency thesis" (SDT), i.e. the claim that (visual) perceptual experiences are necessarily situation-dependent, insofar as they represent objects' situation-dependent properties. In my critical response to her paper, I focus on her argument from the "epistemic dependence thesis" (EDT), according to which "perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representations of the relevant situation-dependent properties" (Schellenberg 2008, 75). I consider what support she musters for EDT, so as to make an objection (...)
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  26. Corijn van Mazijk: Perception and reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, New York: Routledge, 2020, 192 pp., ISBN 978-0-367-44180-7, ISBN 978-1-003-01022-7. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 55 (1):119-123.
    Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots of McDowell’s (...)
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  27. Constancy and Constitution.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):781-798.
    I argue for the following claims: (1) A core Husserlian account of perceptual constancy needs to be given in terms of indicative future-oriented conditionals but can be complemented by a counterfactual account; (2) thus conceived, constancy is a necessary aspect of content. I speak about a “core Husserlian” account so as to capture certain ideas that Michael Madary has presented as the core of Edmund Husserl's approach to perceptual constancy, viz., that “perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of (...)
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  28. learning to see others. Perception, Types, and Position-Taking in Husserl’s Phenomenology.Elisa Magrì - 2021 - In Elisa Magrì & Anna Bortolan (eds.), Empathy, Intersubjectivity, and the Social World: The Continued Relevance of Phenomenology. Essays in Honour of Dermot Moran. Degruyter. pp. 261-278.
  29. Sonic Environments as Systems of Places: A Critical Reading of Husserl’s Thing and Space.Martin Nitsche - 2021 - Open Philosophy 4 (1):136-148.
    This article offers a thorough and critical reading of Husserl’s Thing and Space. This reading is principally motivated by the effort to methodologically design a phenomenological–topological approach to the research of lived sonic environments. In this book, Husserl lays foundations of phenomenological topology by understanding perceptions as places and defining, consequently, the space as a system of places. The critical reading starts with pointing out the ambiguity of location in Thing and Space, which consists mainly in the insufficient implementation of (...)
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  30. Percepción y conceptos: McDowell y Husserl sobre los contenidos de la experiencia.Carlota Serrahima - 2021 - Investigaciones Fenomenológicas 5:311.
    En este artículo se presentan algunas consideraciones relativas al debate sobre si el contenido de la experiencia perceptiva es o no conceptual. En particular, se pretende formular una crítica general al proyecto conceptualista de John McDowell apelando a algunas de sus asunciones de fondo –asunciones relativas a los requisitos que toda teoría sobre la relación entre percepción y juicio ha de cumplir, y que en su caso le conducen a considerar necesaria la tesis de que los contenidos de la percepción (...)
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  31. Painful Experience and Constitution of the Intersubjective Self: A Critical-Phenomenological Analysis.Jessica Stanier & Nicole Miglio - 2021 - In Susi Ferrarello (ed.), Phenomenology of Bioethics: Technoethics and Lived Experience. Springer. pp. 101-114.
    In this paper, we discuss how phenomenology might cogently express the way painful experiences are layered with complex intersubjective meaning. In particular, we propose a critical conception of pain as an intricate multi-levelled phenomenon, deeply ingrained in the constitution of one’s sense of bodily self and emerging from a web of intercorporeal, social, cultural, and political relations. In the first section, we review and critique some conceptual accounts of pain. Then, we explore how pain is involved in complex ways with (...)
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  32. The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.Roi Bar - 2020 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28 (1):53-72.
    This paper compares the enactive approach to perception, which has recently emerged in cognitive science, with the phenomenological approach. Inspired by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the enactive theorists Alva Noë and Evan Thompson take perception to be a result of the interaction between the brain, the body and the environment. Their argument turns mostly on the role of self-motion and sensorimotor knowledge in perceptual experience. It was said to be entirely consistent with phenomenology, indeed its revival. However, this issue is under (...)
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  33. Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1):85-108.
    Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness (...)
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  34. Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.
    Several commentators have recently attributed conflicting accounts of the relation between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination to Husserl. Some say he is a proponent of the conjunctive view that the two kinds of experience are fundamentally the same. Others deny this and purport to find in Husserl distinct and non-overlapping accounts of their fundamental natures, thus committing him to a disjunctive view. My goal is to set the record straight. Having briefly laid out the problem under discussion and the terms (...)
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  35. Husserl’s 1901 and 1913 Philosophies of Perceptual Occlusion: Signitive, Empty, and Dark Intentions.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (2):123-139.
    This paper examines the evolution of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perceptual occlusion. This task is accomplished in two stages. First, I elucidate Husserl’s conclusion, from his 1901 Logical Investigations, that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by partial signitive acts. I focus on two doctrines of that account. I examine Husserl’s insight that signitive intentions are composed of Gehalt and I discuss his conclusion that signitive intentions sit on the continuum of fullness. Second, the paper discloses how Husserl (...)
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  36. Review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell. [REVIEW]Tony Cheng - 2020 - Phenomenological Reviews 6.
  37. Husserl’s philosophical estrangement from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate.Andrea Cimino - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):743-779.
    Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a ‘phenomenology of sense-deception.’ On the other hand, it has generated contrasting—if not utterly incompatible—readings of Husserl’s own account of sense perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl’s reflection on sensory perception, and highlights the (...)
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  38. Asunto de abstracción o de carácter: Husserl y Brentano en torno a la Wahrnehmungsvorstellung y la Phantasievorstellung.Felipe Guerrero Cordero - 2020 - Hybris, Revista de Filosofí­A 11 (2):289-313.
    The distinction between perception and fantasy is not a cliché among others. Tracing the path to its correct elaboration even allows us to think this distinction as the engine of the early Husserlian phenomenology. For this reason, this brief article aims to contrast Brentano and Husserl's vision of this subject. For the former, fantasy is an improper representation [Vorstellung] with an intuitive nucleus; for the latter, it has a properly intuitive character. In this transit, it will be shown that this (...)
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  39. Co-seeing and seeing through: reimagining Kant’s subtraction argument with Stumpf and Husserl.Clare Mac Cumhaill - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6):1217-1239.
    ABSTRACT I draw on Carl Stumpf’s essay “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (1891), and his precocious On the Psychological Origin of the Idea of Space (1873), to set out a charge he raises against Kant’s form/matter distinction. The charge rests, I propose, on the supposition that colourless extension, or empty space, cannot be seen. I consider an objection that Stumpf raises against Kant’s notorious ‘subtraction’ argument. Kant supposes that we can ‘take away’ from the representation of a body all that the understanding (...)
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  40. Correction to: Bar, Roi. The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.Scott Davidson - 2020 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28 (1).
    A correction has been made to: Bar, Roi. The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, v. 28, n. 1, p. 53-72, june 2020.The incorrect abstract was included with the original publication of DOI 10.5195/jffp.2020.928The original article has been updated to reflect this change.
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  41. Peripheral Experience and Epistemic Neutrality: Color at the Margins.Emiliano Diaz - 2020 - Husserl Studies 37 (1):1-17.
    I argue that Husserl’s account of passive synthesis can be developed into a phenomenology of peripheral experience. Peripheral experiences are not defined by their location in visual space but by their phenomenal and intentional character, by what these experiences are like and how they present things in the world. Further, I argue that peripheral experience is of a piece with our most basic background convictions about the world. As such, the periphery is epistemically neutral, but not therefore empty of meaning. (...)
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  42. Transcendental Anticipation: A Reconsideration of Husserl’s Type and Kant’s Schemata.Emiliano Diaz - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (1):1-23.
    In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...)
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  43. Van Mazijk, Corijn: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell.Maxime Doyon - 2020 - Husserl Studies 37 (1):93-101.
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  44. Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.
    One of Edmund Husserl's theoretical priorities throughout his philosophical career was to understand the nature of perceptual experience. His analyses of perceptual experience had a profound impact on subsequent thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, such as Aron Gurwitsch and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Naturally, his account of perception remains a topic of discussion among Husserl scholars. Despite the attention it has received over many decades, Husserl interpreters diverge considerably in how they understand his views and their relation to current debates in the (...)
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  45. Bodily expressions, feelings, and the direct perception account of social cognition.Francesca Forlè - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):1019-1034.
    In this paper, I will argue in favor of a direct perception account of social cognition, focusing on the idea that we can directly grasp at least some mental states of others through their bodily expressions. I will investigate the way we should consider expressions and their relations to mental phenomena in order to defend DP. In order to do so, I will present Krueger and Overgaard’s idea of expressions as constitutive proper parts of the mental phenomena expressed and I (...)
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  46. The phenomenology of pain.Saulius Geniusas - 2020 - Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
    The Phenomenology of Pain is the first book-length investigation of its topic to appear in English. Groundbreaking, systematic, and illuminating, it opens a dialogue between phenomenology and such disciplines as cognitive science and cultural anthropology to argue that science alone cannot clarify the nature of pain experience without incorporating a phenomenological approach. Building on this premise, Saulius Geniusas develops a novel conception of pain grounded in phenomenological principles: pain is an aversive bodily feeling with a distinct experiential quality, which can (...)
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  47. Color as a problem of phenomenological aesthetics.Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kormin - 2020 - Философия И Культура 9:9-33.
    The aim of the study is to clarify the aesthetic concept of color perception from the phenomenological reasoning of Edmund Husserl. Today, the orientation diagram of the field of phenomenological research is formed in various zones: from theological to naturalistic. In which of these zones the structures of the phenomenological analysis of color are located is not an easy question. The coloristic region is constituted according to the degree of consciousness, including aesthetic consciousness. It is extremely difficult to meet with (...)
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  48. The Intentionality of Perception: An Updated Husserlian Approach.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang University Press.
    In my book, I argue that there is reason to adopt a kind of updated Husserlian approach to perceptual intentionality, viz., based on the idea that perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions. Drawing upon the ideas of the renowned German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), I bring center-stage the notion of perceptual fulfillment, a kind of non-inferential confirmation, which may take place as part the ongoing perceptual experience. Thus, when looking at a red tomato, I may anticipate that if I turn it (...)
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  49. Perceptual confidence: A Husserlian take.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):354-364.
    In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, i.e., confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, e.g., for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like (...)
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  50. Recalcitrant Emotions: A Phenomenological View.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Problemos 97.
    In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without contradiction” which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The (...)
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