Doubts about `Uncertainty without all the doubt'

Mind and Language Symposium (2015)
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Abstract

The storage hypothesis—as described by Norby—is a descriptive thesis (for it yields systematic predictions of human behaviour across a wide range of situations) that has as a core commitment that degrees of belief are stable, persistent states. It is not clear to me that such a view is widely held in philosophy. If the storage hypothesis is not widely held, then arguments against it become less interesting. But is Norby’s argument against the view compelling in any case? I shall argue that it is not.

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Nicholas J. J. Smith
University of Sydney

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