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Marco Fenici
Università degli Studi di Firenze
  1. Il test della falsa credenza.Marco Fenici - 2013 - Analytical and Philosophical Explanation 8:1-56.
    La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi utilizzano il test della falsa credenza per valutare la capacità dei bambini di attribuire stati mentali a se stessi e a agli altri. Tuttavia non è stato ancora pienamente compreso né quali requisiti cognitivi siano necessari per passare il test né quale sia il loro sviluppo. In questo articolo (...)
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  2.  14
    Social Cognitive Abilities in Infancy: Is Mindreading the Best Explanation?Marco Fenici - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):387-411.
    I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by claiming (...)
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  3.  49
    Embodied Social Cognition and Embedded Theory of Mind.Marco Fenici - 2012 - Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307.
    Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false belief test at age (...)
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  4.  25
    A Simple Explanation of Apparent Early Mindreading: Infants’ Sensitivity to Goals and Gaze Direction.Marco Fenici - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):497-515.
    According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...)
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  5.  23
    Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content.Marco Fenici - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):298-302.
    Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804645.
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  6.  64
    What Does the False Belief Test Test?Marco Fenici - 2011 - Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.
    The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical issue of discovering children’s early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of capacities that we associate to the very concept. I claim (...)
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  7.  19
    Do Apes Read Minds? By Kristin Andrews.Marco Fenici - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):550-552.
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  8.  4
    What is the Role of Experience in Children's Success in the False Belief Test: Maturation, Facilitation, Attunement or Induction?Marco Fenici - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):308-337.
    According to a widely shared view, experience plays only a limited role in children's acquisition of the capacity to pass the false belief test: at most, it facilitates or attunes the development of mindreading abilities from infancy to early childhood. Against the facilitation—and also the maturation—hypothesis, I report empirical data attesting that children and even adults never come to understand false beliefs when deprived of proper social and linguistic interaction. In contrast to the attunement hypothesis, I argue that alleged mindreading (...)
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  9. Doing Without Concepts - Edouard Machery. [REVIEW]Marco Fenici - 2009 - Humana Mente 11.
     
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  10.  2
    Action Understanding in Infancy: Do Infant Interpreters Attribute Enduring Mental States or Track Relational Properties of Transient Bouts of Behavior?Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):237-257.
    We address recent interpretations of infant performance on spontaneous false belief tasks. According to most views, these experiments show that human infants attribute mental states from a very young age. Focusing on one of the most clearly worked out, minimalist versions of this idea, Butterfill and Apperly's "minimal theory of mind" framework, we defend an alternative characterization: the minimal theory of rational agency. On this view, rather than conceiving of social situations in terms of states of an enduring mental substance (...)
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  11.  2
    Interview with Daniel Dennett.Marco Fenici & Stefano Di Piazza - 2011 - Humana Mente 15.
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  12.  4
    Rappresentazione tacita della conoscenza e interpretazione delle capacità di cognizione sociale nella prima infanzia.Marco Fenici - 2012 - Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 18 (1):197-216.
    Recent studies demonstrated that 15-month-olds selectively respond to others’ (false) beliefs. According to an epistemic mentalist interpretation, this attests that 15-month-olds possess a rudimentary capacity to attribute beliefs. Weaker interpretations suggest instead that infants are only sensitive to others’ (false) beliefs because they can detect their proximal correlates. These two opposed interpretations often appeal to principled objections. In contrast, I argue that the dispute can be brought back to its empirical basis if we clearly explain what it means having ‘tacit’ (...)
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  13. Empirismo e filosofia della mente - Wilfrid Sellars. [REVIEW]Marco Fenici - 2008 - Humana Mente 5.
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  14. Effective Intentions - Alfred Mele. [REVIEW]Marco Fenici - 2011 - Humana Mente 15.
     
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  15. Forme del divenire. Evo‐devo: la biologia evoluzionistica dello sviluppo - Alessandro Minelli. [REVIEW]Marco Fenici - 2008 - Humana Mente 6.
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  16. Individuo e persona. Tre saggi su chi siamo - G. Boniolo, G. De Anna, U. Vincenti. [REVIEW]Marco Fenici - 2008 - Humana Mente 6.
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  17. La mente sociale - Cristina Meini e Massimo Marraffa. [REVIEW]Marco Fenici - 2008 - Humana Mente 5.
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  18.  20
    Psychology and Psychologies: Which Epistemology?Marco Fenici (ed.) - 2009 - Humana.Mente.
    If the definition of a scientific discipline depends on the definition of its object of investigation, the unity of psychology should depend on the unitarian description of the mind. However, the mind is anything but a unitarian concept. Its common sense definition is subject to temporal and geographical variation because the mental is also a cultural construct; and the variety of psychological disciplines nowadays existing proposes several definitions of the mental. The epistemology of psychology investigates the definition of the mental (...)
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  19. Pensieri Materiali - Simone Gozzano. [REVIEW]Marco Fenici - 2008 - Humana Mente 5.
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