Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778 (2017)

Authors
Andrew Moon
Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees. Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.
Keywords belief  confidence  credence  degrees of belief  metaphysics of degrees  partial belief
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2017.1320201
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References found in this work BETA

Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.
Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.

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