The motivation question

Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3413-3430 (2016)
Authors
Nicholas Southwood
Australian National University
Abstract
How does it happen that our beliefs about what we ought to do cause us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do? This is what John Broome calls the "motivation question." Broome’s answer to the motivation question is that we can bring ourselves, by our own efforts, to intend to do what we believe we ought to do by exercising a special agential capacity: the capacity to engage in what he calls enkratic reasoning. My aim is to evaluate this answer. In doing so, I shall focus on three core aspects of Broome’s overall account: his account of ought, his account of enkratic rationality, and his account of enkratic reasoning in particular. In each case I suggest there are problems.
Keywords Enkrasia  Enkratic reasoning  Rationality  Reasoning  Normative judgement
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0719-y
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