Abstract
The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene or FDE. This blocks the usual road to fixed-point results for Kripke's theory of truth within these semantics and consequently the paper is predominantly an exploration of fixed point results for Kripke's theory of truth within non-monotone semantics. Using the theory of quasi-inductive definitions we show that in case of the subjunctive theories of knowledge the so-called Kripke jump will have fixed points despite the non-monotonicity of the semantics: Kripke's theory of truth can be successfully applied in the framework of subjunctive theories of knowledge.
Keywords Truth  Kripke's Theory of Truth  Non-monotonicity  Subjunctive Theories of Knowledge  Subjunctive Conditionals  Quasi-Inductive Definitions
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
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Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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