Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):619-639 (2014)

Authors
Catherine Sutton
Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is exactly what we should expect at the intersection of part sharing and the supervenience of the mental on the physical. I end by responding to the overcrowding objection, the personhood objection, the personal-pronoun reference problem and the epistemic objection.
Keywords animalism  thinkers  psychological continuity  personal identity  first-person  Locke  colocation  collocation  co-location
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqu036
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
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Citations of this work BETA

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles About Material Objects.Bradley Rettler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):842-868.
Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
Self-Made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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