Related categories

165 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 165
  1. added 2019-01-02
    Personale Identität Ohne Persönlichkeit? Anmerkungen Zu Einem Vernachlässigten Zusammenhang.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2016 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123 (1):114-145.
    Recent decades have seen an increasing tendency to exclude the phenomenon of personality from the metaphysical investigation of personal identity. We are advised not to confuse personal identity as a philosophical subject, namely as the metaphysical issue of specifying what it is that makes a person staying numerically self-identical over time, with the psychological question of 'personal identity' which asks what makes someone the individual person they are with their particular character and history. However, one might be unsatisfied with this. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-01-02
    Körper oder Organismus? Eric T. Olsons Cartesianismusvorwurf gegen das Körperkriterium transtemporaler personaler Identität.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2010 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117 (1):88-120.
    Eric Olson distinguishes his animalistic account of transtemporal personal identity from the apparently similar Bodily Criterion, among other things, by accusing the latter of being contaminated with Cartesian implications owing to its usage of the term ‚body‘. In contrast, Olson argues, Animalism is able to avoid these implications by substituting the concept of body for the concept of organism, which makes Animalism not only a distinct position, but also the better alternative to the Bodily Criterion. The paper critically reconstructs Olson’s (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-09-24
    Die Zerlegung des Ichs. Über die Grundlagen personaler Identität.Marc Andree Weber - 2014 - Münster: Mentis.
    Können wir als Personen irreversible Gedächtnisverluste überleben? Wie steht es mit Teletransportationen? Wie mit jahrelangem Einfrieren? Fragen wie diese sind weit davon entfernt, bloße Denksportaufgaben für Science-Fiction-Fans zu sein. Vielmehr verraten uns Antworten darauf, welche unserer Eigenschaften uns wirklich wichtig sind und was unser Wesen ausmacht. -/- Unglücklicherweise beantworten Vertreter unterschiedlicher Theorien personaler Identität diese Fragen auf völlig verschiedene Weise. Manche schöpfen die Plausibilität ihrer Positionen aus phantasievollen Gedankenexperimenten; anderen sind dieselben Gedankenexperimente für eine ernsthafte Einbeziehung in die philosophische Theoriebildung (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2018-09-21
    Zwölf Antworten auf Williams' Paradox.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (1):128-154.
    Theories of personal identity face a paradox, which traces back to Bernard Williams: some scenarios obviously show that mental continuity is what solely matters in survival; others, on the contrary, show with equal obviousness that it is bodily continuity. Different authors have produced diverging and partly conflicting answers in response to that problem. Based on recent research concerning the structure of philosophical thought experiment, this paper reevaluates and, for the first time, neatly classifies those answers. What is more, several existing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2018-09-20
    The Immunological Self.Zdenka Brzović - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. Rijeka: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. pp. 81-95.
    The problem of defining the self has traditionally been conceived as a task for philosophers. However, the development of immunology in the second part of the 20th century has led many scientists to conclude that immunology is the science of the self. This led to two different approaches to biological individuality: physiological individuation that is mostly concerned with organisms seen as strongly cohesive and unified metabolic entities, and evolutionary individuation where evolution by natural selection is seen as the best framework (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-08-11
    Rabbits: A Screenplay.Paul Bali - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-07-13
    Memory, Organisms and the Circle of Life.Rina Tzinman - 2018 - In Valerio Buonomo (ed.), The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the metaphysics of personal identity over time. Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: pp. 243-273.
  8. added 2018-06-22
    Filmul Solaris, regia Andrei Tarkovsky – Aspecte psihologice și filosofice.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    În acest eseu evidențiez principalele aspecte psihologice și filosofice desprinse din filmul Solaris regizat de Andrei Tarkovski, precum și tehnicile cinematografice utilizate de regizor pentru a-și transmite mesajele spectatorului. În ”Introducere” prezint pe scurt elementele relevante din biografia lui Tarkovski și o prezentare generală a romanului Solaris a lui Stanislav Lem și filmul Solaris în regia lui Andrei Tarkovsky. În ”Tehnica cinematografică” vorbesc despre ritmul specific al scenelor, mișcarea radicală declanșată de Tarkovsky în cinematografia modernă, rolul elementelor simbolice și iconice, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-06-12
    Review of Fraser MacBride (Ed.), Identity and Modality[REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
  10. added 2018-05-03
    When Do Persons Die?Ben Curtis - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):153-167.
    The topic of this paper is the general thesis that the death of the human organism is what constitutes the death of a person. All admit that when the death of a human organism occurs, in some form or another, this normally does result in the death of a person. But, some maintain, organismic death is not the same thing as personal death. Why? Because, they maintain, despite the fact that persons are associated with a human organism (‘their organism’), they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2018-03-21
    Animal Ethics.Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
  12. added 2018-02-17
    Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism, and the Challenge of the New Mechanist Philosophy of Neuroscience.Daniel D. De Haan - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):9 - 38.
    This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2018-02-17
    The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Clarendon Press. pp. 242.
    One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that the bodily criterion is an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. added 2018-02-17
    Personal Identity and the Radiation Argument.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):38-44.
    Sydney Shoemaker has argued that, because we can imagine a people who take themselves to survive a 'brain-state-transfer' procedure, cerebrum transplant, or the like, we ought to conclude that we could survive such a thing. I claim that the argument faces two objections, and can be defended only by depriving it any real interest.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-01-19
    Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity.Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2017-10-20
    Is Animalism Undermined by Conjoined Twinning Cases?Hugo Luzio - 2017 - Laterális - The University of Reading Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy (1):2-10.
    Animalism claims that we are animals, i.e. biological organisms of the primate species Homo sapiens. If there is a case in which the number of persons differs from the number of organisms, then animalism is false. Timothy Campbell and Jeff McMahan hold that there are, at least, two such cases: the dicephalus and the cephalopagus conjoined twinning cases. Recently, Eric Olson argued that either Campbell and McMahan's arguments assume the point at issue, rely on undefended assumptions, or constitute paradigmatic anti-animalist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2017-09-06
    The Early Reception of Bernard Williams’ Reduplication Argument.Andrea Sauchelli - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (3):326-345.
    The reduplication argument advanced by Bernard Williams in 1956 has greatly stimulated the contemporary debate on personal identity. The argument relies on a famous thought experiment that, although not new in the history of philosophy, has engaged some of the most influential contemporary philosophers on the topic. I propose here an interpretation of the argument and a reconstruction of the early reception that Williams’ paper had in the 6 years immediately after its publication. The works discussed include papers by C. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2017-08-10
    Animal Self-Awareness.Rory Madden - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (9).
    Part of the philosophical interest of the topic of organic individuals is that it promises to shed light on a basic and perennial question of philosophical self-understanding, the question what are we? The class of organic individuals seems to be a good place to look for candidates to be the things that we are. However there are, in principle, different ways of locating ourselves within the class of organic individuals; organic individuals occur at both higher and lower mereological levels than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2017-08-07
    Personal Identity and Brain Identity.Nils-Frederic Wagner & Georg Northoff - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge. pp. 335-351.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2017-07-23
    Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson in "People and Their Bodies".Seth Carter - forthcoming - GRIN Publishing.
    In her essay, “People and their Bodies,” Judith Thomson writes an evaluation of several formulations of the psychological criterion for personal identity and attempts a strategy of criticizing each formulation of the psychological theory. This is done in order to conclude that a physical theory must be the only remaining viable sufficient candidate for explaining personal identity that is both necessary and sufficient, despite its theoretical weaknesses. This paper seeks to analyze Thomson's critique and explain why her chosen formulations of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2017-07-02
    I Think, Therefore I Persist.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):740-756.
    Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2 + 2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2 + 2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. added 2017-04-17
    The Person and the Corpse.Eric T. Olson - 2013 - In Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oup Usa. pp. 80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. added 2017-04-17
    Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2012 - Prolegomena 11 (2):169-180.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. added 2017-04-17
    Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers.David B. Hershenov - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:225-236.
    Shoemaker maintains that when a functionalist theory of mind is combined with his belief about individuating properties and the well-known cerebrumtransplant thought experiment, the resulting position will be a version of the psychological approach to personal identity that can avoid The Problem of Too Many Thinkers. I maintain that the costs of his solution—that the human animal is incapable of thought—are too high. Shoemaker also has not provided an argumentagainst there existing a merely conscious being that is not essentially self-conscious (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. added 2017-04-17
    Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):189-207.
    In this essay I explore the idea that the solution to some important problems of personal identity lies in the philosophy of language: more precisely in the nature of first-person reference. I will argue that the “linguistic solution” is at best partly successful.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  26. added 2017-04-17
    Review of Hud Hudson, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person[REVIEW]Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (4).
  27. added 2017-04-17
    The Rules of Division.Stephen Clark - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine (13):42-43.
    I consider, and rebut, the argument from "twinning" - that zygotes can't be considered human individuals as two or more such individuals could be (sometimes are) produced from one zygote.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2017-04-17
    The Survival of the Sentient.Peter Unger - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):325-348.
    In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. added 2017-04-17
    Identity, Consciousness, and Value.Robert C. Coburn & Peter Unger - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):131.
  30. added 2017-04-17
    Consciousness and Self-Identity.Peter Unger - 1987 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):63-100.
  31. added 2017-03-27
    Animals, Advance Directives, and Prudence: Should We Let the Cheerfully Demented Die?D. G. Limbaugh - 2016 - Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 2 (4):481-489.
    A high level of confidence in the identity of individuals is required to let them die as ordered by an advance directive. Thus, if we are animalists, then we should lack the confidence required to apply lethal advance directives to the cheerfully demented, or so I argue. In short, there is consensus among animalists that the best way to avoid serious objections to their account is to adopt an ontology that denies the existence of brains, hands, tables, chairs, iced-tea, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2017-03-17
    What Animalists Should Say About Animals.Andrew Higgins - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):109-124.
    Animalism is the thesis that each human person is numerically identical to an animal. This work remains neutral on the truth of animalism. Instead of addressing the thesis, it considers the logical implications regarding a range of thought experiments in the personal identity literature, such as the brain transplant case, and argues that many prominent defenders of animalism have misapplied their own view. Based on what is generally accepted in the philosophy of biology, animalists ought to change their positions on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2017-03-06
    Are We Our Brains?Stephen Burwood - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. added 2017-03-06
    Objects and Persons.LR Baker - unknown
  35. added 2016-12-08
    Identity, Individuation and Substance.David Wiggins - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):1-25.
    The paper takes off from the problem of finding a proper content for the relation of identity as it holds or fails to hold among ordinary things or substances. The necessary conditions of identity are familiar, the sufficient conditions less so. The search is for conditions at once better usable than the Leibnizian Identity of Indiscernibles (independently suspect) and strong enough to underwrite all the formal properties of the relation.It is contended that the key to this problem rests at the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. added 2016-12-08
    Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity.Daniel Kolak - 2008 - Synthese 162 (3):341-372.
    Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. added 2016-12-08
    Many Minds, No Persons.W. R. Carter - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70.
    Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. added 2016-12-08
    Human People or Human Animals?Eric T. Olsen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (2):159-81.
  39. added 2016-12-01
    The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism.David Shoemaker - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 303-328.
    Animalism—the view that the identity across time of individuals like us consists in the persistence of our animal organisms—does poorly at accounting for our identity-related practical concerns. The reason is straightforward: whereas our practical concerns seem to track the identity of psychological creatures—persons—animalism focuses on the identity of human organisms who are not essentially persons. This lack of fit between our practical concerns and animalism has been taken to reduce animalism’s plausibility (relative to psychological criteria of identity). In this paper, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. added 2016-10-13
    Our Animal Interests.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.
    Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2016-06-17
    Embodied Mind Sparsism.S. Clint Dowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.
    If we are physical things with parts, then accounts of what we are and accounts of when composition occurs have important implications for one another. Defenders of restricted composition tend to endorse a sparse ontology in taking an eliminativist stance toward composite objects that are not organisms, while claiming that we are organisms. However, these arguments do not entail that we are organisms, for they rely on the premise that we are organisms. Thus, sparsist reasoning need not be paired with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. added 2016-06-03
    Conceivability, Possibility and the Resurrection of Material Beings.Thomas Atkinson - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2):115-132.
    In his 1998 postscript to ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ Peter van Inwagen argues that the scenario he describes by which God might resurrect a human organism, even though probably not true, is still conceivable and, consequently, ‘serves to establish a possibility’, namely, the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of material beings. Van Inwagen, however, has also argued in favour of ‘modal scepticism’ [van Inwagen in, God, knowledge and mystery: essays in philosophical theology, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995b, pp. 11–12; van (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2016-04-22
    A Continuidade Física Garante a Persistência Pessoal no Tempo.Hugo Luzio - forthcoming - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia.
    Defendemos que a continuidade física garante a persistência pessoal no tempo. Determinamos, primeiro, os fundamentos teóricos e conceptuais do problema metafísico da identidade pessoal no tempo: apuramos a noção relevante de «identidade pessoal», a questão da persistência temporal simpliciter e aquilo em que consistem critérios identitários e princípios de individuação. Examinamos propriedades lógicas e formais do conceito de identidade: as leis da congruência, o princípio lógico da identidade, a reflexividade, simetria e transitividade, distinguimos as relações de identidade qualitativa e numérica (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2016-04-21
    The Animal, the Corpse, and the Remnant-Person.Andrea Sauchelli - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):205–218.
    I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal, it is still appealing to those (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2016-02-25
    Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Gasser Georg and Stefan Matthias, Eds. Cambridge University Press, 2012. XI + 259 Pp. $95 (Hardback). [REVIEW]A. R. J. Fisher - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (4):1-3.
  46. added 2016-02-15
    Animalism and Person Essentialism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.
    Animalism is the view that human persons are human animals – biological organisms that belong to the species Homo sapiens. This paper concerns a family of modal objections to animalism based on the essentiality of personhood (persons and animals differ in their persistence conditions; psychological considerations are relevant for the persistence of persons, but not animals; persons, but not animals, are essentially psychological beings). Such arguments are typically used to support constitutionalism, animalism’s main neo-Lockean rival. The problem with such arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. added 2016-01-26
    Hylomorphism and Resurrection.William Jaworski - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):197-224.
    Hylomorphism provides an attractive framework for addressing issues in philosophical anthropology. After describing a hylomorphic theory that dovetails with current work in philosophy of mind and in scientific disciplines such as biology and neuroscience, I discuss how this theory meshes with Christian eschatology, the doctrine of resurrection in particular.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. added 2016-01-08
    Identity of the Dead: What Does It Matter?Masayuki Yoshida - 2010 - Philosophy Pathways 155.
  49. added 2015-11-02
    Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   131 citations  
  50. added 2015-11-02
    Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
    The topic of this book is material objects. Like most interesting concepts, the concept of a material object is one without precise boundaries.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   169 citations  
1 — 50 / 165