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  1. Two Aspects of Physical Identity.Ernest W. Adams - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (August):111-134.
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  2. Personal Identity and Memory Transfer.Karl Ameriks - 1976 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):385-391.
  3. Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
    : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is a thinking (...)
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  4. Functionalism and Thinking Animals.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.
    Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the (...)
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  5. Conceivability, Possibility and the Resurrection of Material Beings.Thomas Atkinson - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2):115-132.
    In his 1998 postscript to ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ Peter van Inwagen argues that the scenario he describes by which God might resurrect a human organism, even though probably not true, is still conceivable and, consequently, ‘serves to establish a possibility’, namely, the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of material beings. Van Inwagen, however, has also argued in favour of ‘modal scepticism’ [van Inwagen in, God, knowledge and mystery: essays in philosophical theology, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995b, pp. 11–12; van (...)
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  6. A Reply to Anders’ ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being: Van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death’.Thomas Atkinson - 2015 - Sophia 54 (4):577-592.
    In his paper ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being’ Paul Anders attempts to show that Peter van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person, combined with the belief that human persons survive death, faces a dilemma. Either, on the one hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death that cannot escape the duplication objection, or, on the other hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death (...)
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  7. Our Animal Interests.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.
    Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.
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  8. You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
    According to the doctrine of animalism, we are animals in the primary and non-derivative sense. In this article, I introduce and defend a novel argument for the view.
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  9. The Elimination Argument.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):475-482.
    Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.
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  10. Objects and Persons.LR Baker - unknown
  11. What Am I? (Discussion of Eric T. Olson's 'Was I Ever a Fetus?', Psychological-Continuity View of Personal Identity).LR Baker - unknown
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  12. Big-Tent Metaphysics.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S1):8-15.
    Eric Olson won the hearts of my graduate students by dedicating his book “to the unemployed philosophers.” (The students subsequently got fine jobs, but it’s the thought (or rather the sympathy) that counts.) As appreciated as the dedication was, however, I doubt that it was responsible for the wonderful reception that Olson’s book, The Human Animal, has had. Rather, the cleverness of his arguments, the vigor with which Olson writes, and the new interpretations of old thought experiments and arguments have (...)
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  13. Review: Eric T. Olson: What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. [REVIEW]Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):1120-1122.
  14. Response to Eric Olson.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S1):43-45.
  15. Persons and Other Things.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
    In the large recent literature on the nature of human persons, persons are usually studied in isolation from the world in which they live. What persons are most fundamentally, philosophers say, are human animals, or brains, or perhaps souls -- without any consideration of the social and physical environments without which persons would not exist. In this article, I want to compensate for such overly narrow focus. Instead of beginning with the nature of persons cut off from any environment, I (...)
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  16. Précis of Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW]Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592-598.
  17. Rabbits: A Screenplay.Paul Bali - manuscript
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  18. Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal's Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do.Sam Baron & Christina Dyke - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):109-133.
    According to conventionalist accounts of personal identity, persons are constituted in part by practices and attitudes of certain sorts of care. In this paper, we concentrate on the most well-developed and defended version of conventionalism currently on offer (namely, that proposed by David Braddon-Mitchell, Caroline West, and Kristie Miller) and discuss how the conventionalist appears forced either (1) to accept arbitrariness concerning from which perspective to judge one's survival or (2) to maintain egalitarianism at the cost of making “transfiguring” decisions (...)
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  19. Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships.M. Bekoff (ed.) - 2007 - Greenwood Press.
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  20. Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...)
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  21. A New Argument for Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):685-690.
    The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then considered and answered.
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  22. Animalism and Personal Identity.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.
    After motivating the general problem of personal identity and considering several possible accounts, this entry reviews a variety of arguments for and against the animalist criterion of personal identity.
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  23. Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
    The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...)
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  24. Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.
    This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.
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  25. Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity.Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who (...)
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  26. Persons and Relics.Roland Breeur & Arnold Burms - 2008 - Ratio 21 (2):134–146.
    We describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity. The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolisation: each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolised entity. Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here: they are cherished, desired or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because (...)
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  27. Persons and Their Brains.Andrew A. Brennan - 1969 - Analysis 30 (October):27-31.
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  28. The Immunological Self.Zdenka Brzović - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. Rijeka: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. pp. 81-95.
    The problem of defining the self has traditionally been conceived as a task for philosophers. However, the development of immunology in the second part of the 20th century has led many scientists to conclude that immunology is the science of the self. This led to two different approaches to biological individuality: physiological individuation that is mostly concerned with organisms seen as strongly cohesive and unified metabolic entities, and evolutionary individuation where evolution by natural selection is seen as the best framework (...)
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  29. Are We Our Brains?Stephen Burwood - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
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  30. Animal and Paradigm in Plato.Edward Butler - 2014 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2):311-323.
    The paradigm according to which the cosmos is ordered by the demiurge is characterized in the Timaeus as ‘Animal Itself,’ while παράδειγμα in the vision of Er from the Republic denotes the patterns of lives chosen by individual humans and other animals. The essay seeks to grasp the animality of the paradigm, as well as the paradigmatic nature of animality, by means of the homology discernible between these usages. This inquiry affirms the value within a Platonic doctrine of principles of (...)
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  31. Coital Frequency and Twinning.B. Bønnelykke, J. Olsen & J. Nielsen - 1990 - Journal of Biosocial Science 22 (2):191-6.
  32. Body And Self, One And Inseparable.P. A. Campbell - 1942 - San Francisco: Kennedy.
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  33. Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning.Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.
    We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism —the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning : dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
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  34. Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson in "People and Their Bodies".Seth Carter - forthcoming - GRIN Publishing.
    In her essay, “People and their Bodies,” Judith Thomson writes an evaluation of several formulations of the psychological criterion for personal identity and attempts a strategy of criticizing each formulation of the psychological theory. This is done in order to conclude that a physical theory must be the only remaining viable sufficient candidate for explaining personal identity that is both necessary and sufficient, despite its theoretical weaknesses. This paper seeks to analyze Thomson's critique and explain why her chosen formulations of (...)
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  35. Many Minds, No Persons.W. R. Carter - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70.
    Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...)
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  36. Will I Be a Dead Person?W. R. Carter - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167 - 171.
    Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity.
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  37. The Rules of Division.Stephen Clark - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine (13):42-43.
    I consider, and rebut, the argument from "twinning" - that zygotes can't be considered human individuals as two or more such individuals could be (sometimes are) produced from one zygote.
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  38. Identity, Consciousness, and Value.Robert C. Coburn & Peter Unger - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):131.
  39. How Brains Think.David Coder - 1973 - Dialogue 12 (1):78-86.
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  40. Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons.Kevin Corcoran (ed.) - 2001 - Cornell University Press.
    This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...
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  41. The Identity of a Person and His Body.Fraser Cowley - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):678-683.
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  42. The Human Animal.Thomas P. Crocker - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (1):161-163.
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  43. When Do Persons Die?Ben Curtis - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):153-167.
    The topic of this paper is the general thesis that the death of the human organism is what constitutes the death of a person. All admit that when the death of a human organism occurs, in some form or another, this normally does result in the death of a person. But, some maintain, organismic death is not the same thing as personal death. Why? Because, they maintain, despite the fact that persons are associated with a human organism (‘their organism’), they (...)
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  44. Identity Over Time, Constitution and the Problem of Personal Identity.Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory. John Benjamins. pp. 348-371.
    What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the relationship between a person and his body. One answer to the question about the relationship between a person and the thing he calls ‘his body’ is that they are two things composed of the same matter at the same time (like a clay statue and the piece (...)
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  45. Physicalism and Resurrection.Stephen T. Davis - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  46. Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism, and the Challenge of the New Mechanist Philosophy of Neuroscience.Daniel D. De Haan - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):9 - 38.
    This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I (...)
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  47. Are We Essentially Persons? Olson, Baker, and a Reply.David Degrazia - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
  48. The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.Frederick Doepke - 1996 - Open Court Publishing Company.
    The Kinds of Things strongly supports the commonsense belief that in normal human life even changes in our deeply-held affections and ideals do not erode the ...
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  49. Embodied Mind Sparsism.S. Clint Dowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.
    If we are physical things with parts, then accounts of what we are and accounts of when composition occurs have important implications for one another. Defenders of restricted composition tend to endorse a sparse ontology in taking an eliminativist stance toward composite objects that are not organisms, while claiming that we are organisms. However, these arguments do not entail that we are organisms, for they rely on the premise that we are organisms. Thus, sparsist reasoning need not be paired with (...)
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  50. Michael Quante, Person.Annette Dufner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):569-570.
    Michael Quante’s book Person offers a systematic and argumentative assessment of the question what a person is and accounts for the multiple aspects that play a role in our everyday understanding of the term. Quante is skeptical about the possibility of constructing a purely psychological account of the person and proposes to base the diachronic unity conditions of persons on the human organism. At the same time he acknowledges that psychological considerations, including the notion of a person’s personality, are important (...)
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