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  1. Rabbits.Paul Bali - manuscript
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  2. Filmul Solaris, regia Andrei Tarkovsky – Aspecte psihologice și filosofice.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    În acest eseu evidențiez principalele aspecte psihologice și filosofice desprinse din filmul Solaris regizat de Andrei Tarkovski, precum și tehnicile cinematografice utilizate de regizor pentru a-și transmite mesajele spectatorului. În ”Introducere” prezint pe scurt elementele relevante din biografia lui Tarkovski și o prezentare generală a romanului Solaris a lui Stanislav Lem și filmul Solaris în regia lui Andrei Tarkovsky. În ”Tehnica cinematografică” vorbesc despre ritmul specific al scenelor, mișcarea radicală declanșată de Tarkovsky în cinematografia modernă, rolul elementelor simbolice și iconice, (...)
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  3. Animalism and Brains.Alexander Pruss - manuscript
    I argue that it is possible for a human animal to survive the loss of all bodily parts other than the brain.
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  4. The Feeling Animal.Andrew M. Bailey & Allison Krile Thornton - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    For good or for ill, we have animal bodies. Through them, we move around, eat and drink, and do many other things besides. We owe much – perhaps our very lives – to these ever-present animals. But how exactly do we relate to our animals? Are we parts of them, or they of us? Do we and these living animals co-inhere or constitute or coincide? Or what? Animalism answers that we are identical to them. There are many objections to animalism, (...)
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  5. Human Beings Among the Beasts.Andrew M. Bailey & Alexander R. Pruss - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this article, we develop and defend a new argument for animalism -- the thesis that we human persons are human animals. The argument takes this rough form: since our pets are animals, we are too. We’ll begin with remarks on animalism and its rivals, develop our main argument, and then defend it against a few replies.
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  6. Why Animalism Matters.Andrew M. Bailey, Allison Krile Thornton & Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist’s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims – that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan -- unburdened by modal or criterial commitments – still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such (...)
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  7. Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson in "People and Their Bodies".Seth Carter - forthcoming - GRIN Publishing.
    In her essay, “People and their Bodies,” Judith Thomson writes an evaluation of several formulations of the psychological criterion for personal identity and attempts a strategy of criticizing each formulation of the psychological theory. This is done in order to conclude that a physical theory must be the only remaining viable sufficient candidate for explaining personal identity that is both necessary and sufficient, despite its theoretical weaknesses. This paper seeks to analyze Thomson's critique and explain why her chosen formulations of (...)
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  8. In Search of the Simple View.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press.
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
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  9. The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In A. Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Philosophia.
    In The Human Animal I argued that we are animals, and that those animals do not persist by virtue of any sort of psychological continuity. Rather, personal identity in this sense consists in having the same biological life. And I said that a human life requires a functioning brainstem. Rina Tzinman takes this and other remarks to imply that personal identity consists in the continued functioning of the brainstem, which looks clearly false. I say it doesn’t follow. But Alan Shewmon (...)
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  10. Persons, Animals, Ourselves by Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW]C. S. Sutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv057.
  11. Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity.Iva Apostolova & Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (1):129-149.
    Standard views of personal identity over time often hover uneasily between the subjective, first-person dimension, and the objective, third-person dimension of a person’s life. Since both dimensions capture something integral to personal identity, we show that neither can successfully be discarded in favor of the other. The apparent need to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, however, presents standard views with problems both in seeking an ontological footing of, as well as epistemic evidence for, personal identity. We contend that a fresh look (...)
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  12. Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
    This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View, the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de (...)
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  13. Using Phenotypology Hypotheses as a Personality Assessment Tool: The Tentative Validation Study.Vitalii Shymko - 2020 - PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNAL 6 (5):9-17.
    The transformational pace of modern education, healthcare, business management systems, etc., requires new approaches for prompt and reliable personality assessment. Phenotypology is one of such theories and it claims of the discovered interconnections of a person’s psychological and psychophysical characteristics on the basis of individual features of his/her phenotype. The article aim is to present some validation results for the Phenotypology hypotheses as a possible tool for personality assessment. In order to verify connections between phenotypic treats and individual behavior, we (...)
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  14. ПерезАГрУзКА а. в. НеХаев омский государственный технический университет, г. омск личНости и выживаНие.а. в НеХаев - 2020 - Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 5 (3):101-108.
    статья содержит реконструкцию аргумента стремительных психологических изменений скотта кэмпбелла. согласно требованиям стандартного психоло- гического подхода, тождество личности основано на постоянстве ее воспо- минаний, убеждений, желаний и намерений. личность сохраняет свое тож- дество во времени, если обладает сильной психологической связанностью и преемственностью. структура аргумента стремительных психологических изменений сопоставляется с аргументом невероятно длительных психологи- ческих изменений дэвида льюиса. главными целями критических атак этих аргументов служат временная рассогласованность психологической связан- ности и преемственности, а также тезис редукционизма, что все важные для выживания факты могут (...)
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  15. Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition.Radim Bělohrad - 2019 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 26 (2):207–227.
    Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea (...)
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  16. Are We Essentially Animals?Joungbin Lim - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (3):383-409.
    Animalism is the view that we human individuals are animals. And standard animalists claim that if we are animals, we are animals essentially. This is because they believe that if we are animals, we are essentially members of the human kind (e.g., human animal, Homo sapiens), and as a result, we have the criterion of identity by virtue of that kind. The goal of this paper is to reject the claim that our being animals implies our essentially being animals. I (...)
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  17. Animalism, Abortion, and a Future Like Ours.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):317-332.
    Marquis’ future-like-ours argument against the morality of abortion assumes animalism—a family of theories according to which we are animals. Such an assumption is theoretically useful for various reasons, e.g., because it provides the theoretical underpinning for a reply to the contraception-abstinence objection. However, the connection between the future-like-ours argument and one popular version of animalism can prove lethal to the former, or so I argue in this paper.
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  18. When Do Persons Die?: Indeterminacy, Death, and Referential Eligibility.Ben Curtis - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):153-167.
    The topic of this paper is the general thesis that the death of the human organism is what constitutes the death of a person. All admit that when the death of a human organism occurs, in some form or another, this normally does result in the death of a person. But, some maintain, organismic death is not the same thing as personal death. Why? Because, they maintain, despite the fact that persons are associated with a human organism (‘their organism’), they (...)
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  19. Strategy for Animalism.Joungbin Lim - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (4):419-433.
    The central argument for animalism is the thinking animal problem : if you are not an animal, there are two thinkers within the region you occupy, i.e., you and your animal body. This is absurd. So you are an animal. The main objection to this argument is the thinking brain problem : animalism faces a problem that is structurally analogous to TAP. Specifically, if animalism is true, you and your brain both think. This is absurd. So animalism is false. The (...)
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  20. Memory, Organisms and the Circle of Life.Rina Tzinman - 2018 - In Valerio Buonomo (ed.), The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the metaphysics of personal identity over time. Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: pp. 243-273.
  21. Our Animal Interests.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.
    Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.
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  22. The Immunological Self.Zdenka Brzović - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. Rijeka: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. pp. 81-95.
    The problem of defining the self has traditionally been conceived as a task for philosophers. However, the development of immunology in the second part of the 20th century has led many scientists to conclude that immunology is the science of the self. This led to two different approaches to biological individuality: physiological individuation that is mostly concerned with organisms seen as strongly cohesive and unified metabolic entities, and evolutionary individuation where evolution by natural selection is seen as the best framework (...)
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  23. Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism, and the Challenge of the New Mechanist Philosophy of Neuroscience.Daniel D. De Haan - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):9 - 38.
    This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I (...)
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  24. The Incompatibility of Animalism and Eliminativism.Joungbin Lim - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (4):395-407.
    The central case for animalism is the ‘thinking animal problem’: if I am not an animal, this leads to an absurd multiplication of thinkers. One objection to this argument is that animalism faces a structurally analogous problem called the ‘thinking parts problem’: animalism ends up with an absurdity that any part of an animal that includes a brain can be a candidate for being a thinker. Some leading animalists try to avoid the thinking parts problem by eliminating the brain (and (...)
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  25. Is Animalism Undermined by Conjoined Twinning Cases?Hugo Luzio - 2017 - Laterális - The University of Reading Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy (1):2-10.
    Animalism claims that we are animals, i.e. biological organisms of the primate species Homo sapiens. If there is a case in which the number of persons differs from the number of organisms, then animalism is false. Timothy Campbell and Jeff McMahan hold that there are, at least, two such cases: the dicephalus and the cephalopagus conjoined twinning cases. Recently, Eric Olson argued that either Campbell and McMahan's arguments assume the point at issue, rely on undefended assumptions, or constitute paradigmatic anti-animalist (...)
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  26. Animal Self-Awareness.Rory Madden - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (9).
    Part of the philosophical interest of the topic of organic individuals is that it promises to shed light on a basic and perennial question of philosophical self-understanding, the question what are we? The class of organic individuals seems to be a good place to look for candidates to be the things that we are. However there are, in principle, different ways of locating ourselves within the class of organic individuals; organic individuals occur at both higher and lower mereological levels than (...)
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  27. The Animal, the Corpse, and the Remnant-Person.Andrea Sauchelli - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):205–218.
    I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal, it is still appealing to those (...)
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  28. The Early Reception of Bernard Williams’ Reduplication Argument.Andrea Sauchelli - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (3):326-345.
    The reduplication argument advanced by Bernard Williams in 1956 has greatly stimulated the contemporary debate on personal identity. The argument relies on a famous thought experiment that, although not new in the history of philosophy, has engaged some of the most influential contemporary philosophers on the topic. I propose here an interpretation of the argument and a reconstruction of the early reception that Williams’ paper had in the 6 years immediately after its publication. The works discussed include papers by C. (...)
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  29. Personal Identity and Brain Identity.Nils-Frederic Wagner & Georg Northoff - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge. pp. 335-351.
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  30. Zwölf Antworten auf Williams' Paradox.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (1):128-154.
    Theories of personal identity face a paradox, which traces back to Bernard Williams: some scenarios obviously show that mental continuity is what solely matters in survival; others, on the contrary, show with equal obviousness that it is bodily continuity. Different authors have produced diverging and partly conflicting answers in response to that problem. Based on recent research concerning the structure of philosophical thought experiment, this paper reevaluates and, for the first time, neatly classifies those answers. What is more, several existing (...)
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  31. Conceivability, Possibility and the Resurrection of Material Beings.Thomas Atkinson - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2):115-132.
    In his 1998 postscript to ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ Peter van Inwagen argues that the scenario he describes by which God might resurrect a human organism, even though probably not true, is still conceivable and, consequently, ‘serves to establish a possibility’, namely, the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of material beings. Van Inwagen, however, has also argued in favour of ‘modal scepticism’ [van Inwagen in, God, knowledge and mystery: essays in philosophical theology, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995b, pp. 11–12; van (...)
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  32. You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
    According to the doctrine of animalism, we are animals in the primary and non-derivative sense. In this article, I introduce and defend a novel argument for the view.
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  33. Persons, Animals, Ourselves, by Paul F. Snowdon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 260, £30. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):411-414.
  34. Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity.Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who (...)
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  35. Embodied Mind Sparsism.S. Clint Dowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.
    If we are physical things with parts, then accounts of what we are and accounts of when composition occurs have important implications for one another. Defenders of restricted composition tend to endorse a sparse ontology in taking an eliminativist stance toward composite objects that are not organisms, while claiming that we are organisms. However, these arguments do not entail that we are organisms, for they rely on the premise that we are organisms. Thus, sparsist reasoning need not be paired with (...)
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  36. Four-Dimensional Animalism.David B. Hershenov - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 208-228.
    The typical Four-Dimensionalist metaphysics will posit the existence of many entities with thinking temporal parts. To determine which of these entities are persons, Hud Hudson relies upon an exclusion principle that withholds the label “person” from objects possessing any parts that don’t contribute to thought. Thus the human animal can’t be identified with the human person because it initially consists of mindless embryonic temporal parts. Since even normal adult human animals have parts such as hair and nails that don’t appear (...)
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  37. Animal Ethics.Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Several attractive principles about prudential concern and moral responsibility seem to speak against animalism. I criticize some animalist responses to this kind of problem, and suggest another answer, which has similarites with the most important argument in favor of animalism: the “thinking animal” argument.
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  38. Self-Made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
    The Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun ‘I’, so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the very (...)
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  39. Animals, Advance Directives, and Prudence: Should We Let the Cheerfully Demented Die?David Limbaugh - 2016 - Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 2 (4):481-489.
    A high level of confidence in the identity of individuals is required to let them die as ordered by an advance directive. Thus, if we are animalists, then we should lack the confidence required to apply lethal advance directives to the cheerfully demented, or so I argue. In short, there is consensus among animalists that the best way to avoid serious objections to their account is to adopt an ontology that denies the existence of brains, hands, tables, chairs, iced-tea, and (...)
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  40. A Continuidade Física Garante a Persistência Pessoal No Tempo.Hugo Luzio - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):699-724.
    In the following sections we hold that physical continuity suffices personal persistence through time. First, we determine the theoretic and conceptual grounds of the metaphysical problem of personal identity, the relevant notion of «personal identity», the temporal persistence question simpliciter, what identity criteria and individuation principles are, and the formal properties of the identity concept. We differentiate between the simple and complex views, stating the reductionist thesis transversal to the latter. In the central sections, we discuss the main arguments and (...)
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  41. Personale Identität Ohne Persönlichkeit? Anmerkungen Zu Einem Vernachlässigten Zusammenhang.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2016 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123 (1):114-145.
    Recent decades have seen an increasing tendency to exclude the phenomenon of personality from the metaphysical investigation of personal identity. We are advised not to confuse personal identity as a philosophical subject, namely as the metaphysical issue of specifying what it is that makes a person staying numerically self-identical over time, with the psychological question of 'personal identity' which asks what makes someone the individual person they are with their particular character and history. However, one might be unsatisfied with this. (...)
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  42. The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism.David Shoemaker - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 303-328.
    Animalism—the view that the identity across time of individuals like us consists in the persistence of our animal organisms—does poorly at accounting for our identity-related practical concerns. The reason is straightforward: whereas our practical concerns seem to track the identity of psychological creatures—persons—animalism focuses on the identity of human organisms who are not essentially persons. This lack of fit between our practical concerns and animalism has been taken to reduce animalism’s plausibility (relative to psychological criteria of identity). In this paper, (...)
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  43. Review of Persons, Animals, Ourselves by Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW]C. S. Sutton - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):429-432.
  44. Thinking Animals and the Thinking Parts Problem.Joshua L. Watson - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):323-340.
    There is a thinking animal in your chair and you are the only thinking thing in your chair; therefore, you are an animal. So goes the main argument for animalism, the Thinking Animal Argument. But notice that there are many other things that might do our thinking: heads, brains, upper halves, left-hand complements, right-hand complements, and any other object that has our brain as a part. The abundance of candidates for the things that do our thinking is known as the (...)
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  45. A Reply to Anders’ ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being: Van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death’.Thomas Atkinson - 2015 - Sophia 54 (4):577-592.
    In his paper ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being’ Paul Anders attempts to show that Peter van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person, combined with the belief that human persons survive death, faces a dilemma. Either, on the one hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death that cannot escape the duplication objection, or, on the other hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death (...)
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  46. Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
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  47. Identity Over Time, Constitution and the Problem of Personal Identity.Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a Science and Theory. John Benjamins. pp. 348-371.
    What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the relationship between a person and his body. One answer to the question about the relationship between a person and the thing he calls ‘his body’ is that they are two things composed of the same matter at the same time (like a clay statue and the piece (...)
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  48. I Think Therefore I Persist.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):740-756.
    Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2 + 2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2 + 2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal (...)
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  49. What Animalists Should Say About Animals.Andrew Higgins - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):109-124.
    Animalism is the thesis that each human person is numerically identical to an animal. This work remains neutral on the truth of animalism. Instead of addressing the thesis, it considers the logical implications regarding a range of thought experiments in the personal identity literature, such as the brain transplant case, and argues that many prominent defenders of animalism have misapplied their own view. Based on what is generally accepted in the philosophy of biology, animalists ought to change their positions on (...)
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  50. Persons and Personal Identity.Amy Kind - 2015 - Polity.
    As persons, we are importantly different from all other creatures in the universe. But in what, exactly, does this difference consist? What kinds of entities are we, and what makes each of us the same person today that we were yesterday? Could we survive having all of our memories erased and replaced with false ones? What about if our bodies were destroyed and our brains were transplanted into android bodies, or if instead our minds were simply uploaded to computers? -/- (...)
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