On Behalf of the Eliminativist

American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (4):39-40 (2010)
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Chris Kaposy raises an important point about possible interpretations of advances in neuroscience. Specifically, he argues that certain advances may pose a problem for the folk conception of the mind, and he explains that this has crucial implications for our views of what makes a person rational, free, or responsible. In this commentary, I press Kaposy’s position from an eliminativist perspective. Although he may be correct in believing that advances in neuroscience may be difficult to square with our common or folk views, his arguments fall far short of convincing us that these sort of advancements are somehow impossible to adopt, or somehow inconsistent with the possibility of something like epistemic normativity. In fact, I will argue that the most rational course of action may involve adopting radical views about neuroscientific advances.



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J. Robert Thompson
Mississippi State University

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