On the general argument against internalism

Synthese 170 (1):147 - 153 (2009)
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections.
Keywords Epistemology  Epistemic justification  Internalism  Externalism  John Greco
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9362-2
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References found in this work BETA
Warrant: The Current Debate.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Highlights of Recent Epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.

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Citations of this work BETA
Internalist Virtues and Knowledge.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.
I Know I Am Not Gettiered.Michael Veber - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.

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