Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627 (2019)
Authors |
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Abstract |
This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the
requirements of rationality with the demands of normative
reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends
upon the agent’s perspective and the other upon features of
the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons
perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist
in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic
constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative
reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational
requirements will correspond to the demands generated by
normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible,
it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no
epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists
would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest
are too slack. This points to a general problem with the
reasons-first program. Once we recognize that the agent’s
epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we
have to reject the idea that the features of the agent’s situation
can help determine what we should do. Either rationality
crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make
unreasonable demands.
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Keywords | Reasons First Normativity of Rationality Enkrasia |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12518 |
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Citations of this work BETA
One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.
Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.
Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):77-91.
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