PHENOMENOLOGY BETWEEN EGO-SPLIT AND INFINITE REGRESS: THE DEBATES OF TRANSCENDENTAL REFLECTION AROUND 1930
Abstract
I intend to map the historical debates about the Husserlian notion of
transcendental reflection around 1930. This notion is essential for Husserl’s project
of transcendental phenomenology. The easiest interpretation, based on Brentano’s
notion of secondary perception, is represented by Rudolf Zocher’s critique of Husserl.
Zocher’s critique is attacked by Eugen Fink, Husserl’s last assistant. His defence
however contains very strong claims concerning the feasibility of the transcendental
reduction, and the different kind of egos it involves. I investigate, whether his
point of view could be attributed to Husserl. A detailed theory of transcendental
reflection is found in Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, but it is possible to track
down its Husserlian origins. I examine some common sense objections, as represented
by a critique which originates from Roman Ingarden, Husserl’s former student. I
intend to show that it is possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian approach to
the problem of transcendental reflection, which is less prone to the objections that
could be levelled against Fink’s exposition.