In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 244--81 (2000)

Authors
J. David Velleman
New York University
Abstract
This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics
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Functionalism and the Role of Psychology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - forthcoming - Journal of Economic Methodology:1-19.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.

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