Decisions without Sharp Probabilities

Philosophia Scientiæ 19:213-225 (2015)

Authors
Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia
Abstract
Adam Elga [Elga 2010] argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions
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