An ecological approach to cognitive (im)penetrability

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):399-400 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,442

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The case for cognitive penetrability.Philippe G. Schyns - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.
Better ways to study penetrability with detection theory.Neil A. Macmillan - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):384-384.
Modular architectures and informational encapsulation: A dilemma.Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.
Distinguishing Top-Down From Bottom-Up Effects.Nicholas Shea - 2015 - In D. Stokes, M. Matthen & S. Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 73-91.
Cognitive Ecology.Edwin Hutchins - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):705-715.
Color and cognitive penetrability.John Zeimbekis - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
42 (#280,645)

6 months
2 (#301,800)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations