To what extent do beliefs affect apparent motion?

Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):471-491 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A number of studies in the apparent motion literature were examined using the cognitive penetrability criterion to determine the extent to which beliefs affect the perception of apparent motion. It was found that the interaction between the perceptual processes mediating apparent motion and higher order processes appears to be limited. In addition, perceptual and inferential beliefs appear to have different effects on perceived motion optimality and direction. Our findings suggest that the system underlying apparent motion perception has more than one stage and is informationally encapsulated from cognitive factors

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
32 (#445,919)

6 months
2 (#785,137)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Ways of worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Hassocks [Eng.]: Harvester Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
The Logic Of Perception.Irvin Rock - 1983 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references