Abstract

My dissertation is an exploration of the role of emotion in our moral and social lives. It consists of a series of essays that explore the nature and normativity of emotion structured into two large sections. The first section explores the nature of emotion, where I attempt to provide a philosophical psychology of emotion that explains its centrality to our normative nature. Essentially, I argue that emotions are evaluative perceptions that have a direct modulatory effect on our motivational profile. The second section focuses more on normative questions of emotion. I begin by setting up a framework to approach the question of how to determine when an emotion is fitting. The kinds of emotions and fittingness standards that rightly demand our normative allegiance, I suggest, are those that constitutively secure for us key prudential and moral goods. I then apply some of the lessons gleaned to look at two emotions: shame and disgust. I provide analyses of them and try to elucidate the kind of value that they alert us to and enable. Both shame and disgust, often maligned emotions, play important roles and ought not to be discarded from our moral and social lives.