In his book “Schiller as Philosopher”, Frederick Beiser laments that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller's conception of freedom of the will as “heautonomy” (...) that stands behind his critique and modification of Kant's ethics. However, the systematic significance of Schiller's theory of freedom is not obvious. Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed—as Beiser has demanded—because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller's theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self‐determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller's own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant's ethical rigorism. Rather, it shows serious transformations of Kant's approach, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason. (shrink)

Different from the autonomy of understanding in cognition and the autonomy of practical reason in praxis, the heautonomy in the judgement of taste is reflexive. The reflexivity consists not only in the fact that the power of judgement legislates to its own usage but also, and more importantly, it legislates to itself through its own operative process. This normativity, based on the self-referential structure of pure aesthetic judgement and the a priori principle of subjective, internal purposiveness, can be regarded (...) as a self-discovering and self-flourishing principle that organically grows out of the aesthetic experience and, at the same time, regulates its growth in return. In this scenario, aesthetic freedom can be identified as a third kind of freedom different from Kant’s transcendental freedom and practical freedom – a flexible and living freedom with spontaneous legislation, but not bound by any determinate laws. (shrink)

In this paper, I will shed light on Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s and Friedrich Schiller’s conceptions of practical self-determination after Kant. First, I outline Kant’s conception of freedom as autonomy. I then explain the so-called “Reinhold’s dilemma,” which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions, which arises from Kant’s theory of autonomy. I then show how Reinhold and Schiller tried to escape this dilemma by developing an elaborated theory of individual freedom. I will argue that Reinhold’s (...) and Schiller’s symmetrical account of freedom to act according and against the moral law is not to be confused with freedom of indifference but can be reconstructed in terms of practical self-determination on the basis of first-order desires and second-order volitions. (shrink)

In this article I aim to show how the sensus communis grounds – with the use of its maxims – the possibility of reflection, endowing the subject with a duty, that of becoming human, where becoming human presupposes self-education. Self-education entails on one hand overcoming one’s self interest or private feelings – that is what an aesthetic judgment demands: To love something other than one-self; on the other hand, and more fundamentally, self-education entails to place one-self under the indeterminate idea (...) of humanity. Like all ideas and ideals of reason, the idea of humanity places an unrealizable demand upon the subject, to become part of an idea, in this case, that of humanity; this demand can never be met. Nevertheless, it is the strive to meat such a demand that motivates the human being to become human. To do so the subject will need to reflect appropriating thus the world through the exercise of its judgment. (shrink)

When we are touched by the beauty of something, we cannot help judging that the experienced feeling of pleasure ought to be shared by others. In Kantian terms, a pure judgement of taste requires or demands everyone else's assent. I examine some of the major intricacies of Kant's account and aim to correct some distorted views of it. I argue that the autonomy (or ‘heautonomy’) of the judgement of taste is not presupposed but made possible by the modal requirement (...) as such, i.e. by the ‘subjective necessity’ to be universally shared—a necessity that is not moral, as several commentators hold, but strictly epistemological. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This chapter reconstructs Schiller’s ethics and moral philosophy, referring to his aesthetics and anthropology. After analyzing Schiller’s early philosophical writings, the chapter outlines Schiller’s ethical thought in his On Grace and Dignity (1793) and his On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters (1795). The chapter argues that Schiller’s ethics is complex: it comprises a perfectionist, a teleological, and an expressivist dimension, and can be interpreted as a kind of virtue ethics. In doing so, the chapter focuses (...) on Schiller’s conception of man, of will, of heautonomy, and of the aesthetic state. (shrink)

Life in the text and the text in life: here we would place an “ethos of reading”. To sustain this, the categories of “subject” and “object” are rethought; the process of ethic liberation of sensibility and pleasure encouraged by Kant are described; the independence of taste with respect to knowle..