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  1.  29
    Maybe This Old Dinosaur Isn’T Extinct: What Does Bayesian Modeling Add to Associationism?Irina Baetu, Itxaso Barberia, Robin A. Murphy & A. G. Baker - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):190-191.
    We agree with Jones & Love (J&L) that much of Bayesian modeling has taken a fundamentalist approach to cognition; but we do not believe in the potential of Bayesianism to provide insights into psychological processes. We discuss the advantages of associative explanations over Bayesian approaches to causal induction, and argue that Bayesian models have added little to our understanding of human causal reasoning.
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  2.  43
    Propositional Learning is a Useful Research Heuristic but It is Not a Theoretical Algorithm.A. G. Baker, Irina Baetu & Robin A. Murphy - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):199-200.
    Mitchell et al.'s claim, that their propositional theory is a single-process theory, is illusory because they relegate some learning to a secondary memory process. This renders the single-process theory untestable. The propositional account is not a process theory of learning, but rather, a heuristic that has led to interesting research.
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  3.  3
    Does the Inherence Herutistic Take s to Psychological Essentialism?Anna Marmodoro, Robin A. Murphy & A. G. Baker - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (5):494-495.
    We argue that the claim that essence-based causal explanations emerge, hydra-like, from an inherence heuristic is incomplete. No plausible mechanism for the transition from concrete properties, or cues, to essences is provided. Moreover, the fundamental shotgun and storytelling mechanisms of the inherence heuristic are not clearly enough specified to distinguish them, developmentally, from associative or causal networks.
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