If payoffs are tickets for binary lotteries, which involve only two money prizes, then rationality requires expected value maximization in tickets. This payoff scheme was increasingly used to induce risk neutrality in experiments. The experiment presented here involved lottery choice and evaluation tasks. One subject group was paid in binary lottery tickets, another directly in money. Significantly greater deviations from risk neutral behavior are observed with binary lottery payoffs. This discrepancy increases when subjects have easy access to the alternatives' expected (...) values and mean absolute deviations. Behavioral regularities are observed at least as often as with direct money payoffs. (shrink)

We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders’ reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders’ intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders’ provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being “tough” and effectively “educate” proposers. Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to (...) the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responder’s enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported. (shrink)

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey. In a 2 ×\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\times $$\end{document} 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey. Our results provide clear evidence for Hey’s conjecture that recall negatively affects performance in sequential search. With experience, however, search behavior with and without recall converges toward the optimal reservation rule. We further find that (...) the utilization of optimal reservation rules is independent from the stochastic nature of the search cost. (shrink)