4 found
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Andrew W. Howat [3]Andrew William Howat [1]
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Andrew Howat
California State University, Fullerton
  1.  52
    Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth.Andrew W. Howat - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468.
    This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...)
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  2.  27
    Constituting Assertion: A Pragmatist Critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew W. Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.
    In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' (...)
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  3.  80
    David L. Hildebrand, Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists. [REVIEW]Andrew W. Howat - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.
  4.  76
    Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.
    This paper explores a distinction between two types of response- dependence (RD) account (shallow vs. deep). This distinction is inherent in much of the existing literature, however it is neither widely nor well understood, and has never been drawn explicitly. The distinction is often taken to be a metaphysical, or ‘realism-relevant’ one—i.e. deep RD accounts entail qualified realism (or perhaps anti-realism), while shallow RD accounts are metaphysically neutral. I argue that the distinction is not reliably realism-relevant. I formulate a weaker (...)
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