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Andrew W. Howat [5]Andrew William Howat [1]
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Profile: Andrew Howat (California State University, Fullerton)
  1.  28
    Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth.Andrew W. Howat - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468.
    This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...)
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  2.  17
    Hookway's Peirce on Assertion & Truth.Andrew W. Howat - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (4):419-443.
    pragmatic clarifications of concepts and propositions are best seen as accounts of the commitments we incur when we assert or judge the proposition in question.For those unfamiliar with the distinctive character and methodology of Peirce’s philosophy, it typically appears as though Peirce identifies truth with a particular epistemic property.4 On this interpretation, Peircean Truth is the view that a true proposition is one that would, at least under certain conditions, generate convergence of opinion among rational inquirers, or something along these (...)
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  3.  57
    Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.
  4.  9
    Constituting Assertion: A Pragmatist Critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew W. Howat - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' (...)
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  5.  30
    Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists.Andrew W. Howat - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.
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  6.  32
    Review: David L. Hildebrand. Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003. [REVIEW]Andrew W. Howat - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.